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1 Scope of Document 
The D1.1.1 is a “State of the art” report, containing the findings from a review which aimed to collect 
information about the A-SMGCS Operational Concepts that were applied and finalized in previous 
work (R&D activities and Op. Implementations). 
 
2 Introduction 
The Work Package 1.1 (WP 1.1) of  EMMA (European Airport Movement Management by A-
SMGCS) project aims at ensuring that the major existing A-SMGCS concepts and installations will be 
taken into account to support the development of EMMA’s concept of operations, equipment and 
V&V activities. To achieve this objective a review of previous/on going A-SMGCS projects, working 
groups, and ICAO manuals and documentations, as well as active site visits with CDG and Heathrow 
have been performed. 
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3 Review and Analysis of A-SMGCS related 
Programmes/Implementations in Europe 
3.1 BETA ‘operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing A-SMGCS’ 
3.1.1 Background and Objectives of BETA project 
BETA was a European Commission 5th Framework Programme project. The duration of the project 
was 36 months, starting at 2001-01-01.  
 
The operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing an A-SMGCS (BETA) on real airports was its main 
objective. The European Commission Directorate for Transport and Energy (DG-TREN) contracted 
the BETA consortium to measure the operational benefits of an A-SMGCS at two European airports: 
Hamburg and Prague. On the international level, ICAO and EUROCAE WG41 need validated 
performance specifications for future A-SMGCS. Earlier, results have been provided in October 2001 
to AOPG/PT2 for completion of the European A-SMGCS Manual due by the end of December 2001. 
 
The main objectives of the BETA project were to: 
 
• Identify the taxiway, runway and apron utilisation constraints on airport safety, efficiency and 
capacity currently experienced as they related to A-SMGCS 
 
• Generate an A-SMGCS operational concept in terms of modified procedures in order to remove 
or reduce these constraints, 
 
• Show the reduction of air traffic environmental impact that can be achieved through  A-SMGCS 
implementation and 
 
• Provide detailed performance data of sub-systems / systems to be supplied for the completion of 
the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual. 
 
The results of the project supported the work of various aeronautical standardisation and 
harmonisation bodies (AOPG, EUROCAE WG41, etc.) in order to provide them with validated 
performance specifications. Results were provided to AOPG/PT2 for completion of the European A-
SMGCS Manual.    
 
BETA project was dedicated to real Airport implementation and test trials (Hamburg, Prague and 
Braunschweig Research Airport). Licensed controllers and pilots trained in the use of the new system 
were involved in testing having more realistic results. Scheduled airport traffic and additional test 
traffic (specific test aircraft and test vehicles) were used. The Research Consortium chose two 
medium sized European airports, in terms of aircraft movements, peak movements or number of 
passengers. The selection was driven by the experience of the partners that extensive testing with 
new tools and new test procedures were only possible at airport not highly congested. The project 
was based on the analysis of the operational concept and implementation of A-SMGCS adapted 
systems and procedures in order to validate the benefits through field trials. 
 
The concept for the system and its implementation were developed following an incremental 
approach to cope with complex task.  
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3.1.2 Results obtained 
The BETA project has taken proposed Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
(A-SMGCS) technologies and applied them into the operational environment at two medium-sized 
European airports, Hamburg and Prague. The third airport, Braunschweig, was mainly used for 
technical evaluation because of its instrumented facilities and its low traffic levels. Trials at these 
airports involved end-users of these systems, principally controllers and pilots, experiencing how A-
SMGCS functions could influence their performance and the efficiency of the airport movements 
while they carried out their normal tasks. These evaluations were divided into two phases to permit 
some initial operational experience to be gained and thus influence additional development leading to 
the second phase of trials. 
 
A-SMGCS functionalities relating to Surveillance, Control/Alerting, Planning and Guidance, along 
with associated developments of the Human Machine Interface (HMI), were implemented at two main 
test sites to meet currently proposed A-SMGCS performance requirements. 
 
Functional and operational tests were carried out in two years in order to give time to incorporate 
improvements between Phase1 and Phase2. Before testing at the airports, the users were trained in a 
simulated environment to become familiar with the new system: Controllers at NLR and Pilots at 
QinetiQ. 
 
The objective of the functional tests was to measure system and sub-system performance data. Further 
analysis of these data enabled a Verification that the system components were functioning correctly in 
accordance with their technical specifications, prior to starting the operational tests. A Comparison 
between test results and published preliminary performance requirements was conducted in order to 
validate the relevance of the published requirements. Finally, recommendations were developed for 
the revision of the preliminary requirements by the relevant international organisations involved in the 
specification of A-SMGCS. 
 
Time-stamped data were recorded throughout the test periods and used subsequent analysis. 
 
Testing at Braunschweig was only performed during Phase 1. The main aims were to provide an initial 
assessment of the sensor systems that were to be installed later for the BETA trials at Hamburg and 
Prague, and to verify the technical integration of the main BETA sub-systems. At Braunschweig, a 
highly accurate reference system, called SAPOS, was used to assess the accuracy of the surveillance 
sensors. The main functions tested at Braunschweig are set out in the following table: 
 
 Braunschweig Research Airport 
The accuracy, latency and update rate of the individual new sensor technologies: 
• Near-range Radar Network (NRN), a non co-operative sensor 
• ASCS Mode –S multilateration system, a co-operative sensor 
• GP&C, a co-operative sensor employing differential GPS and data-link 
The fusion of surveillance data from the three sensor systems 
The integration between the Sensor Data Fusion (SDF) and the Controller HMI T
es
te
d 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 / 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
ie
s 
The basic functioning of the data-link and the on-board HMI 
Table 3-1 Functions/Technologies tested at Braunschweig Research Airport 
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 Hamburg / Prague Airports 
The accuracy, timeliness and integrity of the overall surveillance 
The correctness and timeliness of the alerting function 
The availability of correct flight plan information in the electronic flight strips 
The ability of the system to provide a taxi route (Prague only) 
The ability of the system to suggest a departure sequence 
The ability of the system to deliver tactical clearance instructions via data-link 
to test aircraft/vehicles T
es
te
d 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 / 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
ie
s 
The correct functioning of the Controller HMI and on-board HMI 
Table 3-2 Functions/Technologies tested at Hamburg and Prague Airports 
3.1.3 Lessons learnt 
Airlines should be encouraged to modify their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the use of 
Mode-S transponders on the ground. Issuing NOTAMs at individual airports is not enough to ensure 
that pilots adopt the correct procedures. 
 
Adequate surveillance for safety critical applications, such as maintaining good visibility capacity in 
low visibility conditions, may not be achievable until all aircraft and vehicles operating in the 
aerodrome manoeuvring area are suitably equipped and co-operating. A significant step forward 
towards this goal would be to find a low cost means of equipping general aviation aircraft and 
vehicles. 
 
The link between the A-SMGCS and the rest of the ATM needs to be clearly defined in terms of data 
ownership, transfer means, access rights and responsibilities. A common shared database for the whole 
system is desirable, but responsibilities for database content and data integrity need to be clearly 
defined. 
 
Improvements should be made to the controller HMI, particularly the presentation of the electronic 
flight strips and the interaction with them. 
 
The close co-operation of controllers and pilots has been, and will remain, essential in developing the 
HMI and in implementing procedural changes required to take full benefit of the new technology. 
 
Controllers have been trained to do their job in a particular way, primarily to ensure that safety is 
maintained at all times. This level of training may also influence their acceptance of a new system 
such as BETA, which has not yet reached a fully developed operational state. The use of the new tools 
may not always be consistent with their previous training and this could cause them to question the 
viability of certain functions. 
 
For future trials, controllers training should set additional focus on providing an understanding of the 
role of the system and the expected benefits. 
 
Benefits can be explained to the controllers but acceptance comes through use in situations where the 
benefits can actually be experienced. The testing in good weather and low traffic levels does not 
necessarily demonstrate that. The system needs to be tested under conditions when the controller is 
experiencing a significant workload with the current system before a proper assessment can be made 
of the type of advantages that could be achieved with the A-SMGCS. Since the greatest benefits of A-
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SMGCS are expected in low visibility, procedures should be developed to permit operational testing 
of a future A-SMGCS under low visibility conditions. 
 
Revised operational procedures are required to accommodate the introduction of various components 
of an A-SMGCS, both for the controller and for the pilot, especially for systems such as data-link. 
 
Future R&D activities should focus on applications that improve ATM operations, as well as on 
developing CNS technologies. Research is needed into the way the role of the human will be affected 
by Air Traffic Management developments, particularly with the use of data-link and new HMI. 
 
It is advisable to run tests over longer periods (estimated to be of the order of 40 hours of operational 
testing) and with many more aircraft that are suitably equipped and to perform prolonged development 
at the airports themselves. Revised procedures, longer periods of observation, test periods in reduced 
visibility conditions, and many participating aircraft are needed to obtain the level of quantitative 
results to show a significant benefit. The active participation of pilots, controllers and regulatory 
bodies will be necessary. 
 
To make a quantitative benefit assessment it will be necessary to find meaningful objective measures 
and to define and establish a stable baseline from which to measure. This may only be possible in a 
simulation environment. Further simulation trials should aim to provide a more quantifiable result of 
the potential operational benefits under high traffic load conditions. Ground simulation trials could 
also address some aspects of the expected benefits from operating A-SMGCS under low visibility and 
high traffic conditions. 
 
A cost benefit analysis should be carried out. To enable a realistic cost benefit analysis, participation 
of all significant stakeholders will be required. The distribution of benefit and cost is likely to be 
uneven so it is important for all participants to understand the implications for implementation of A -
SMGCS. Typical examples of cost benefits that should be analysed are those associated with 
diversions, cancellations, gate management, and taxi time. To demonstrate a benefit, it will be 
necessary to show that a shortfall currently exists that could be improved upon by adoption of A -
SMGCS. 
3.1.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
The BETA project's A-SMGCS concept was composed of the following four basic functions: 
 
¾ Surveillance, 
 
¾ Alerting, 
 
¾ Guidance and 
 
¾ Planning. 
 
These four functions along with the required data communications and Human/Machine Interface 
(HMI) supported the operational requirements proposed by ICAO for Surveillance, Control, Guidance 
and Routing. 
 
The operational requirements that the Surveillance Function should fulfilled are: 
 
• to provide accurate, timely, position information on all movements within the specified 
coverage volume for the site; 
 
• to provide information on the identity of authorised movements; 
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• to provide classification according to size or type (e.g. large, medium, small, aircraft, vehicle, 
obstacle/unknown) for unidentified or unidentifiable objects detected on the movement area; 
• to cope with moving and static aircraft, vehicles and obstacles; 
 
• to provide all data at an update rate sufficient to meet alerting, guidance and planning 
requirements both in terms of time and position; 
• to provide surveillance throughout the aerodrome movement area; 
 
• to provide surveillance throughout that part of the surrounding airspace where aircraft 
movements influence surface operations; 
• to provide a seamless transition between the surveillance of the aerodrome surface and the 
surveillance of traffic in the airspace surrounding the aerodrome. 
 
The Alerting Function evaluated all target reports continuously against a set of monitoring rules. The 
set of monitoring rules was configured for the specific aerodrome layout and was adaptable to 
different operating conditions. For the BETA A-SMGCS the following monitoring rules were 
implemented: 
 
1. incursion into an active runway, 
 
2. incursion into a restricted area, 
 
3. crossing of a lit stop-bar and 
 
4. deviation from assigned route (Prague only). 
 
Although not currently specified as a requirement for A-SMGCS, the BETA system in Prague was 
also configured to monitor flight plans and the operation of flight strips. The alerting function 
requirements postulate that the system should detect alert situations, such as: 
 
¾ Potential collisions; 
 
¾ Incursions into the runway strips and any other designated protected areas; and 
 
¾ Deviations from assigned routes. 
 
Having detected an alert situation, the Alerting Function provided alert reports to specified users. Each 
alert report contained adequate information about the alert situation. 
 
The Guidance Function provided the means to support pilots to taxi in accordance to their plans. 
Various guidance means were available in parallel: ground based guidance means (signs, lights, stop 
bars etc.), follow-me cars, instructions by voice, and data link transmission of complete plans and 
clearances to aircraft equipped with onboard HMI and data link capability. 
 
For the Guidance Function, the operational requirements were: 
 
• to provide the processing and signalling means in order to transfer to the pilot and/or vehicle 
driver the advice and information associated with a clearance; 
• to provide clear indication to pilots and vehicle drivers to follow an assigned route; 
 
• to enable all pilots and vehicle drivers to maintain situational awareness of their position on 
the assigned route; 
• to be capable of accepting a change of route at any time; 
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• to be capable of indicating routes and areas either restricted or not available for use; 
 
• to allow monitoring of the operational status of guidance devices; and 
 
• to provide conflict resolution by activating stop bars. 
 
The Planning Function generated plans for ground movements. A complete plan for any movement of 
a single object comprised the two elements of route- (as outlined in the ICAO manual) and time 
information (e.g. start-up time) in order to gain the expected efficiency benefit. 
The operational requirements for the Planning function, which relates mostly to the taxi routing and 
departure/arrival sequencing aspects, were the following: 
 
1. Enable a route to be designated for each aircraft and vehicle on the movement area; 
 
2. Allow for a change of destination at any time; 
 
3. Allow for a change of a route to the same destination at any time; 
 
4. Not constrain the pilot’s choice of runway exit following the landing; 
 
5. Minimise taxi distances in accordance with the most efficient operational configuration; 
 
6. Recommend runway assignments for departing aircraft; 
 
7. Generate recommended taxi clearances/instructions for arrival and departure aircraft based on 
the taxi plan (accepted by the relevant controller) for the specified aircraft; 
8. Provide sequencing of aircraft to ensure minimum delay and maximum utilisation of the 
available capacity of the aerodrome; 
9. Provide optimised start-up and push-back sequences/times; 
 
10. Be rapidly responsive to operational changes, 
 
11. Be interactive with the Alerting function to minimise junction conflicts. 
 
3.1.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
3.1.5.1 Managerial Issues 
From the BETA experience is recommended to avoid high level goals and to be more specific in terms 
of the objectives in future projects. 
 
For future projects the BETA method of specifying OC (and test plan) first and system design later is 
recommended strongly, with some improvement on timely production of critical documents (like the 
OC) and in depth analysis of existing A-SMGCS performance, before starting to test higher level A-
SMGCS functions and procedures. 
3.1.5.2 Technical Issues 
The BETA project included man-in-the-loop simulator sessions for prototype evaluation and controller 
training. They confirmed that field-testing requires complementary simulator exercises, favouring user 
involvement, and that the testing and training can be extended with higher traffic density and more 
safety-related scenarios than possible at real airports. Rapid prototyping with at least two test phases 
and pre-evaluation was an excellent approach. A minor point was that in the first cycle the level of 
system functionality was not as complete as had been planned. As a consequence the cycle one 
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training content had to be reduced in favour of more prototype testing with controllers in the loop. 
System readiness in cycle two training was better, allowing measured exercises on controller 
performance and Departure Planning. 
3.1.5.3 Implementation Issues 
An outcome from the BETA work is that a primary aspect that needs to be resolved in any 
implementation of an A-SMGCS is the acceptability of the HMI by the end-users of the system. Since 
a principal intention of the A-SMGCS is aimed at providing the operator with the necessary tools to 
support him/her in the performance his/her tasks more effectively in all conditions, then any new HMI 
should be evaluated by the end-users throughout the development cycle prior to operational 
implementation. 
 
The BETA trials revealed that sufficient testing of an operational implementation of an A-SMGCS 
requires a more extended period than was available within the time-scales and resources of the BETA 
project. In order to confirm that the functional performance requirements are met by an installed A-
SMGCS, there would be a necessity to obtain weeks (of the order of about 400 hours) of data 
collection before there is sufficient quantity from which statistical probabilities of the order of 99.9% 
can be derived. 
 
Additionally, any A-SMGCS implementation will need to initially ensure that basic surveillance 
information (i.e. detection and identification) is available for all movements throughout the aircraft 
manoeuvring areas prior to further A-SMGCS functions being incorporated. Reductions in the 
availability or accuracy of the surveillance information are likely to impose limitations on the 
performance and usability of the other components of the system. An assessment would then be 
required to determine whether the level of surveillance is adequate for the type of A-SMGCS being 
implemented or whether the extension or addition of another sensor system is necessary. 
 
Implementation towards a fully operational system would need to be a staged process, initially 
providing the operator with access to improved information, supplementing that which is currently 
available, in order to support the operator in the execution of their tasks. For instance, the integration 
with existing systems at the airport, such as surveillance sensors and flight plan database systems has 
to be fully verified before functional assessment of the A-SMGCS components can be started. 
 
Development and implementation of A-SMGCS functions at an airport needs to be supported by 
representative simulation facilities to improve the transition to the new systems. Experiences from the 
BETA trials showed how user acceptability is dependent on confidence in the operational performance 
of the system. Although the meeting of the A-SMGCS functional requirements should establish the 
capability of the system, it might be proposed that a user assessment is required in stages of increasing 
traffic density and reduced visibility conditions to demonstrate its performance at the operational level.  
 
Therefore, a simulation environment needs to be available in order to provide a realistic representation 
of the airport and its associated traffic movements. This should provide the necessary training 
situations that would allow the user to become familiar with the operation of the system under all 
conditions and to be able to use the system to respond to any situation that is likely to be encountered 
at the airport. Operator appraisals of the A-SMGCS at the airport can also be performed prior to an 
actual operational use of the system. This is consistent with the mandatory training and licensing of 
airport controllers via the use of simulation tools. 
 
Similarly, certain A-SMGCS components, such as an enhanced surveillance display and the 
application of electronic flight strips, can be seen as developments of current systems that are in use. 
Although aspects of the use of these components may be new to the controllers, the operational 
implementation of this function should be capable of being performed without significant changes to 
working practices or procedures. Where tools are being introduced that provide much newer functions 
to the user, associated for instance with the planning/routing and guidance processes, an evaluation 
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period may be required prior to full operational use. This would allow the tools to be used initially in 
an advisory role to assess their performance and establish user acceptability in the operational 
environment before the information supplied by these tools is used directly for control decisions. 
 
The BETA trials highlighted that each airport can have its own characteristics and, to a certain extent, 
methods of operation. Where possible, these should be assessed and incorporated into the simulation 
environment in order to configure the A-SMGCS to the airport before it is fully installed. However, 
some refinement of the A-SMGCS functions may be required following the initial implementation and 
operational testing at the airport. Ideally, the A-SMGCS implementation should be capable of being 
adapted to local procedures rather than forcing changes in procedures because of the inflexibility of 
the functions. This would make the system more readily acceptable to the users and require less 
training and would also mean that the system was more adaptable to different airports. 
 
Furthermore, the trials showed that automating a new system is very time consuming and not 
achievable within just a limited number of days. So, it is highly recommended to improve the training 
and extend the education of the operators (e.g. pilots and controllers) in order to avoid problems in 
using a new system. 
 
Implementation of an operational A-SMGCS is also closely associated with developments in other 
areas of Air Traffic Management, most notably where the A -SMGCS functions are dependent on the 
equipment status of the aircraft. This includes aspects such as the use of data link for clearances and 
the application of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B). The availability of these 
types of system is reliant on specification of the technology that is to be used and on the regulations 
and procedures being issued by the governing bodies. In these circumstances, co -ordination is 
essential and it is likely that it will be specified in terms of a number of years before aircraft are 
required to be suitably equipped.  
 
A-SMGCS implementation will therefore need to be flexible to allow for future system developments 
to be introduced progressively as regulations and operational specifications become defined. So, one 
of the major conclusions of the above discussion is to better integrate on -board 
capabilities/performances into the A-SMGCS operational requirements. This should be considered in 
the further ICAO manual for this work. 
 
All the public documentations produced inside the BETA project are available on the BETA web site 
[17] 
 
EMMA 
State of the Art in A-SMGCS 
 
Save date: 2005-07-27 Public Page 15 
File Name: D111_SAD_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
3.2 ATOPS ‘A-SMGCS Testing of Operational Procedures by 
Simulation’ and SAMS 
3.2.1 Background and Objectives of ATOPS project 
ATOPS (A-SMGCS Testing of Operational Procedures by Simulation) was one of the contracts 
awarded by the European Commission - DG VII in the 4th R&D Framework Programme. The project 
duration was 18 months, starting at January 1999. 
 
Currently, operational procedures on the surface of an aerodrome depend on pilots, air traffic 
controllers, and vehicle drivers using visual observation of the location of the aircraft and vehicles in 
order to estimate their respective relative positions and avoid the risk of collision. Pilots and vehicle 
drivers rely on visual aids (lighting, signage, and markings) to guide them along their assigned routes 
and to identify intersections and holding points. Pilots and drivers are subject to clearance-to-proceed 
instructions issued by the controller based on these visual references. During periods of low visibility, 
controllers must rely on the pilot’s RTF reports and surface movement radar to monitor separation and 
to identify conflicts. In these conditions, pilots, and vehicle drivers find that their ability to operate in 
the “see and be seen” mode is severely impaired. 
 
The European Commission Transport Directorate has been actively encouraging A-SMGCS 
developments through a number of projects, and new procedures using A-SMGCS technologies were 
being developed. 
 
Currently the human operators are helped in their tasks by some technological tools but these have 
rather limited capabilities. 
 
For instance, in the surveillance function, a surface movement radar (SMR) partially, replaces the eyes 
of a controller: the SMR gives the position of the objects on the airport platform but not their identity. 
The controller has to mentally correlate the reported positions with identities gathered by other 
procedures and constantly keep in mind these associations. 
 
Similarly in the control function, the controller has to visually monitor the position of objects and 
evaluate all this data to ensure that aircraft and vehicles are properly separated and do not enter 
restricted or prohibited zones. 
 
In the field of routeing/planning, the controller must know which runway will be used for each flight, 
when it will be used, and which taxiways are available for use at any given time in order to route an 
aircraft on the manoeuvring area. 
 
In the guidance function, the controller (or an assistant) has to manually select the guidance means 
(lights, signs, stop bars…) to guide the aircraft along the designated taxi route. 
 
The ATOPS main objectives were:  
 
-to identify, with the help of end-users and service providers, operational procedures using A-SMGCS 
that are expected to enhance the efficiency and capacity of airport ground movements in a safe 
manner;  
-to conduct simulation tests using the SAMS (SMGCS Airport Movement Simulator) platform to 
enable pilots and controllers to evaluate the chosen procedures and record performance data. 
 
The ATOPS project has been set up to reach several objectives. These are: 
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1. to define and test operational procedures involving A-SMGCS, to demonstrate some of the 
real benefits of A-SMGCS 
2. to evaluate performance parameters for associated sub-systems 
 
3. to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of real time operator-in-the-loop simulation 
means for supporting ATC procedures definition and evaluation 
4. to provide a baseline for 5th Frame Work Programme (FWP) 
 
5. to consult/ inform all interested parties on the conduct and results of the project and to take 
account of their comments in the final reporting. 
 
 
In addition to the project objectives listed above, the results of the ATOPS simulations were expected 
to provide: 
 
-An operational emphasis to complement the technological emphasis of previous A-SMGCS research, 
e.g. DEFAMM. 
-Initial evidence for business cases for implementing A-SMGCS. 
-An input into the ICAO Manual of A-SMGCS for which PT/2 of the AOPG of the ICAO EANPG 
was responsible. 
 
The project duration was 18 months, for collating procedures, conducting simulation tests of Heathrow 
and Schiphol airports and analysing results. A three-month extension period was used for completing 
the final reports and dissemination activities. 
3.2.2 Results obtained 
The first objective, related to the definition of operational procedures was met by: 
 
• defining a list of ATC procedures based on the use of an A-SMGCS 
• testing a limited number of these procedures in a simulated busy airport environment 
• identifying benefits arising from the use of such procedures 
• consultation of ATC authorities. 
 
Through the use of comprehensive questionnaires and interviews with Air Traffic Control authorities 
in four main European airports (Heathrow, Charles De Gaulle, Schiphol, Frankfurt), the ATOPS 
project identified the airports' present SMGCS, future planned A-SMGCS, perceived business benefits 
of A-SMGCS and possible operational procedure topics for A-SMGCS (distinguishing basic or core 
procedures from advanced procedures). This provides a detailed overview of current practice and 
future trends as far as ground movements are concerned. 
 
A number of selected procedures have been tested at Heathrow and Schiphol using the SAMS real-
time, man-in-the-loop simulation platform, linking together a cockpit simulator, control tower 
simulator and a core A-SMGCS simulator. Because the SAMS platform encountered technical 
difficulties and could not be completed, only core procedures have been addressed during the ATOPS 
simulation. General feedback from the ATCOs who participated in the simulations indicated that A-
SMGCS is extremely helpful in supporting the ATCOs in the tasks of identifying and guiding traffic 
on the airport surface. Although no quantitative data have been collected, A-SMGCS appears to 
improve the amount of traffic that can be moved in low-visibility conditions. The observed reduction 
in radio/telephony communications has indicated that ATCO workload decreases. 
 
The second objective, related to performance parameters, was met by carrying out tests of some new 
A-SMGCS based operational procedures in such a way that data was derived and used in the process 
of defining sub-systems and equipment performance parameters. 
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The third objective, related to the validation of simulation means, was reached by demonstrating 
through test scenarios similarities between the simulated and real world operations. 
 
The fourth objective, providing a baseline for the 5th FWP, was met by the preparation of a report 
outlining testing that was usefully performed in the context of the 5th FWP. 
 
The last objective, consulting and/or informing all interested parties, was met by setting up internal 
consultations and two forums. Forum 1 is a consultation forum and will be set up prior to the start of 
the simulation to consult end users and Forum 2 is a dissemination forum to inform end-users, 
equipment providers and regulatory authorities on the results of the simulation. 
3.2.3 Lessons learnt 
The ATOPS identified controller procedures were as follows. 
3.2.3.1  Identification and Identification Verification 
For these tasks and the related interactions with the system, specific ergonomic investigations are 
needed for future systems. 
 
Examples for such subjects of investigations are: 
• In which format shall the identification states be presented to the controller (colour, label, 
electronic flight strip etc.), which identification states are of relevance for the controller 
• How can the recording of the identification verification process be simplified by the system 
(clicking on a field in the label or in the electronic flight progress record etc?) 
• What kind of system integrity and accuracy is minimally required for the ATCO to be able to use 
an A-SMGCS for identification and identification verification purposes (positional accuracy, 
label swap, label drop, etc.) 
• Further work is required on simulation of multi-sensors. In particular the ability to introduce 
realistic delays for various sensor performances should be addressed. Eventually the reliability of 
sensors should also be simulated to present realistic situations to the users of the simulator. 
3.2.3.2 Conflict Detection and Alert 
The airports consulted and the Controllers involved in the simulations were convinced that Conflict 
Detection/ Alert systems were required. Areas that need to be addressed for such systems include: 
• Designing alert systems for particular areas of airports (e.g. so the ATCO would only see alerts 
relevant to the area under his/her control) 
• Presentation of alerts on displays and associated warnings (including which displays and format) 
• Procedures for alerting controllers irrespective of whether they are working head up or head 
down. 
3.2.3.3 Conditional Movement Plans and Conditional Clearances 
Possible items for future investigations with respect to the use of conditional movement plans and 
conditional clearances identified during the ATOPS project are: 
• How to provide the controller with system generated movement plans to support him/her in the 
movement and route planning activity (e.g. questions of optimal mnemonic presentation of plans 
etc.) 
• How to give the controller the opportunity to modify and accept plans in order to select the 
optimal plan. 
• How to present conditional movement plans and conditional instructions in most concise form to 
the controller (e.g. 'cross after ...', 'give way to ...') 
• How to present issued clearances and instructions (including conditional ones) for the moving 
mobiles (label information, presentation of electronic flight and movement progress records etc.) 
in a way that the controller can easily memorise the issued clearance 
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• How to ease the recording of the controller decisions and the issued clearances by the system 
(clicking on waypoints and selecting time slots on the movement screen or in the electronic flight 
progress record etc.) 
3.2.3.4 Advanced A-SMGCS Procedures 
The ‘advanced’ procedures still require a lot of investigation in the near future: 
 
• A number of advanced procedures were listed that could have been simulated in ATOPS but 
were not because of the lack of particularly capability of the SAMS platform. These procedures 
can be further developed in future work. 
• The interaction of the ATCO with these advanced A-SMGCS tools is an area that requires 
research. Tools such as automatic routeing and planning have an important impact on the way the 
ATCOs perform their task. 
• Another area of research would be the involvement of other users besides the ATCOs. Pilots for 
instance will also have to be involved if one starts to develop automatic routeing tools. 
• Ways of presenting information related to automatic routeing to pilots need to be investigated 
further. 
• If on-board tools are going to be used, one will need to keep in mind that most likely not all 
aircraft will be equipped with this kind of instrumentation. How will an A-SMGCS cope with a 
mix of equipped and non equipped aircraft? 
3.2.3.5 A-SMGCS Sub-System Performance 
The performance of A-SMGCS sub-systems is something that needs to be investigated. Once it is 
known what acceptable performance figures for A-SMGCS sub-systems are, A-SMGCS manuals can 
be completed with performance requirements of which many are still unknown. A simulation platform 
would be ideal for this kind of investigation. 
3.2.3.6 Simulation Platform 
The project faced the egg and the hen problem. Developers expected to be provided with procedures to 
develop the HMI according the user needs, whilst controllers expected to see a tool in order to specify 
how to use it. 
 
• For any further testing of new procedures for A-SMGCS, the simulation platform should be well 
understood in terms of its capabilities and the ‘end-users’ and authors of procedures should be 
well familiarised with it. 
• Further testing of A-SMGCS and associated new procedures are carried out in simulation as it 
allows new concepts to be well tested under all conditions before expensive airport installations. 
• Future A-SMGCS platform development, whether based on SAMS or otherwise, should take 
account of the technical and management findings. 
3.2.3.7 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
The technologies employed by ATOPS project were the same as those used in the SAMS platform. 
This subsection summarises the A-SMGCS concept as obtained from the airports consulted in ATOPS 
and outlines A-SMGCS procedures as suggested by ATCOs involved in the project. 
3.2.4 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
An A-SMGCS may have other benefits such as more efficient stand utilisation, taxiway utilisation, 
reduction in controller and/or pilot workload, reduction in required skill levels, reduction of aircraft 
engine emissions due to less ground holding, and a reduction in the costs associated with co-
ordination. Undoubtedly an A- SMGCS will help to prevent GMC capacity becoming a constraint to 
increases - beyond present theoretical maxima - in Low Visibility weather conditions. It could also be 
argued that an A-SMGCS may have the ability to increase runway capacities, at airports that do not 
separate to absolute minima more cost effectively than increasing the skills of the operational staff and 
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modifying the procedures used. 
 
The perceived benefits of A-SMGCS as mentioned by the consulted airports are listed below. 
 
Runway Capacity Benefits: 
 
• The airports do not expect there to be any increases in runway capacity as a result of 
implementing A-SMGCS in day or night conditions. 
• Schiphol expects low visibility runway capacity figures to be brought up to normal day levels if 
A-SMGCS is implemented. 
• Heathrow does not expect an increase in runway capacity as a result of implementing A -
SMGCS. However a basic labelled SMR would permit GMC to match capacity enhancements 
produced by the use of MLS. 
 
GMC Capacity Benefits: 
 
• Schiphol expects better punctuality, reduced controller workload, and more efficient use of stand 
capacity. It also expects reduced delays in low visibility conditions. 
• Heathrow does not expect capacity to increase in day operations. Capacity might increase at 
night with the help of a labelled SMR. 
• Heathrow stated that a basic labelled SMR would permit GMC to match capacity enhancements 
produced by the use of MLS in LVPs. 
• CDG expects that taxi times would be optimised in all conditions. 
 
Efficiency Benefits: 
 
• Schiphol considers that A-SMGCS would allow less position reporting between controllers and 
pilots. This would decrease controller workload. 
• Schiphol and CDG think that taxi times would be optimised in day and night operations. CDG 
think it would be optimised in low visibility also. 
• Heathrow thinks it possible that there would be a reduction in queue size at the holding point 
during day and night operations. Emissions could reduce as a consequence. There could also be 
better data exchange, which would improve stand planning. 
• Heathrow thinks that A-SMGCS would allow a greater number of towing movements at night 
and in low visibility conditions. 
 
Safety Benefits: 
 
All airports agree that a Conflict Alert function would maintain or increase safety levels in all 
conditions. However, the following points were noted: 
 
• Heathrow hoped that the use of Conflict Alert would not provide too many “nuisance” alerts in 
high density operations. 
• Schiphol hoped that computer automation would not decrease the controllers’ situational 
awareness. 
• CDG commented that an efficient planning and routing function would reduce the number of 
conflicts actually occurring and provide a true conflict alert rather than conflict detection. 
• All airports expect there to be safety improvements on taxiways during low visibility conditions 
as a result of A-SMGCS implementation. 
 
Any Other Benefits: 
 
• Heathrow considers that there would be benefits in sharing information with the airport authority, 
for example, recording amount of tonnage across blocks to help plan pavement repairs. 
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• CDG considers that there would be a monetary saving if A -SMGCS implementation relaxes 
regulations about the airfield lighting system at night and during low visibility operations. 
Otherwise it would be costly for ADP to implement red/green lighting. 
 
Other useful information that could be useful in the BETA project: 
 
• Description of Typical Controller Tasks (in ATOPS Deliverable Report ‘D3’) 
• ATC Procedure Design and Hazard Analysis (in ATOPS Deliverable Report ‘D3’) 
 
The Final Summary Report of the ATOPS Project is available on the EC web site [15]. 
3.3 DEFAMM ‘DEmonstration Facilities for Airport Movement 
Management’ 
3.3.1 Background and Objectives of DEFAMM project 
DEFAMM (Demonstration Facilities for Airport Movement Management) is one of the contracts 
awarded by the European Commission - DG VII in the 4th R&D Framework Programme. The project 
duration was 36 months, starting at December 1995. 
 
The aim of the DEFAMM project (Demonstration Facilities for Airport Movement Management) was 
to demonstrate the major A-SMGCS (Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System) 
functions with real facilities in a near-operational airport environment. The project has been carried 
out by partners from industry, research institutes, airport and ATC authorities in the time frame from 
December 1995 until March 1999. In DEFAMM several A-SMGCS demonstrators were built up by 
adaptation development including prototype subsystems. These demonstrators have been tested in 
operational environments of four European airports including the first large-scale demonstrator 
covering all A-SMGCS basic functions that are Surveillance, Control, Routing/Planning and 
Guidance. 
 
The main objectives of the DEFAMM Project were: 
• To implement a demonstrator system for advanced surface movement guidance and control 
functions. 
• To show the users (ATC providers, airports, airlines) the functions through which they would 
gain the benefits of increased traffic management efficiency at maintained or improved safety 
levels. 
• To get the feedback from controllers, pilots and drivers on the acceptability of the 
demonstrated means. 
 
Other important but more technical issues of the DEFAMM project were: 
• To build a system architecture, which is modular and open in order to introduce new 
technologies and to cope with specific airport conditions without discarding all existing 
equipment. This was an important issue for DEFAMM itself but the results can also be a 
guideline for possible follow-on projects. 
• To cover a sufficient variety of airport configurations and to use already existing facilities for 
the demonstration of different A-SMGCS functions. 
• To enhance the integration of existing systems on the airport by showing the advantages gained 
by data exchange during the DEFAMM demonstrations. 
• To define the DEFAMM demonstrations with the customer and users together. It is important 
to identify in a common process those project parameters which form the qualitative and 
quantitative objectives of the demonstrations and which are of relevance to safety levels and to 
efficiency benefits. 
 
To achieve these objectives it was planned that the DEFAMM demonstration facilities as completely 
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as possible cover the required A-SMGCS functions in the form of initial implementations. These 
realisations and related validations were planned for the time frame between 1996 and 1998. The 
support of A-SMGCS functions with technical means and the related testing with the users always 
leads to new conclusions to be used in optimising cycles. It was expected that the results of the 
DEFAMM project will build a basis for follow-on projects. The DEFAMM results shall be used to 
settle the surveillance and control functions and support further research and development on planning 
and guidance methods. 
 
An important use of the DEFAMM demonstration results will be the development of new or adapted 
operational procedures and defined responsibilities in the management of the airport traffic. This 
aspect is important in order to fully achieve the offered benefits of the technical systems. 
3.3.2 Results obtained 
Four airports participated in the demonstration of the A-SMGCS. This is, because the total range of 
the DEFAMM functions forms a rather complex system and one test side only would have been 
completely overloaded. Furthermore, it should be demonstrated that an A-SMGCS can be profitably 
embedded in different environments with a variety of airport facilities and topological constraints. A 
further advantage was the possibility to use several independent test environments like reference 
systems for positioning or digitised airport maps. Last but not least, the support from the airport 
authorities was shared while the test results were enriched by the engagement of several users of the 
A-SMGCS. Especially their experiences were accumulated for the success of this project. 
The airports for the DEFAMM demonstrations were: 
• Bergamo 
• Braunschweig 
• Paris/Orly 
• Köln/Bonn 
In Bergamo a new type of a 95 GHz mini radar was tested. In Braunschweig a new combination of 
cooperative and non-cooperative sensors was tested, including the new Near Range Radar Network 
NRN and DGPS. In Orly a new A-SMGCS planning function for movement expedition of aircraft in 
complex crossing situations was demonstrated in combination with switchable signs, utilising a 
specific controller working position for operation. In Köln/Bonn functional and operational tests were 
performed with the first large-scale A-SMGCS demonstrator, providing the functions Surveillance, 
Control, Planning/Routeing and Guidance in real-time under near operational conditions. 
To summarise the results of the DEFAMM project with respect to the project goals, it can be stated 
that: 
 
• Demonstrator systems for advanced surface movement guidance and control functions have 
been implemented at four European airports including the first large-scale A-SMGCS 
demonstrator in Köln/Bonn. 
• Feedback from controllers, pilots and drivers on the acceptability of the demonstrated means 
was gathered and gave valuable insight for future development and research projects. 
• The functions that provide benefits in efficiency and safety were shown to users (ATC 
providers, airports, and airlines). 
• A modular and open system architecture was built which can be used as a guideline for 
possible follow-on projects. 
• A variety of airport configurations and already existing facilities were used for the 
demonstration of different A-SMGCS functions. 
• The advantages gained by data exchange at the demonstrations of DEFAMM gave motivation 
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to enhance the integration of existing systems at the airports. 
3.3.3 Lessons learnt 
The DEFAMM Surveillance Subsystem was realised as a Multi-Sensor System with Sensor Data 
Fusion (SDF), resulting in a labelled display of the traffic situation for the controller. It was highly 
accepted. For the individual components it is pointed out in the DEFAMM Evaluation Report how 
they have to be improved in order to fulfil operational demands. Improvements are needed in terms of 
continuity of detection by the individual sensors, in terms of enhancements for clear distinction 
between different objects by the non co-operative sensors and in terms of unambiguous combination 
of the information by the Sensor Data Fusion. Additionally, the presentation of the labels and the 
definition of the content of the information presented in the label may profit from harmonisation with 
controllers’ needs. 
The Control Function with its Conflict Detection Support was well accepted by the controllers. This 
was especially true for the area conflict detection (intrusion into prohibited areas) and the runway 
incursion detection. However, specific multiple line-ups and situations where several aircraft interact 
on one runway (enhanced procedures) should be studied by future systems. Concerning the movement 
conflicts on taxiways, it turns out that it is difficult to find clear criteria for the conflict indication. 
Investigations are recommended into how it is possible to reduce the reaction time to be considered by 
the system in order to reduce the necessary safety distances. This could be done possibly by automatic 
guidance commands for pilots and drivers. Controllers should be taken out of this loop because they 
cause the largest delay in the system. 
 
The Guidance Function of DEFAMM, realised by ground based means (switchable centre-line lights) 
and on-board means (the Pilot Driver Assistance Display) was well accepted and highly appreciated 
by pilots and drivers. It was envisaged by these end users that Guidance in a future system shall be a 
combination of ground based and on-board means and that the guidance means shall not fully replace 
the voice interaction between controllers and pilots. Spoken interaction, as a basic human 
communication form should still be used to establish the basic contact between the controllers and the 
pilots and drivers. Ground-based guidance may profit from ergonomic investigations on the size of the 
centre-line light segments in use and on the timing conditions for their activation. 
 
The Planning Functions and the related interactions were not accepted by the controllers, because its 
handling does not conform to their current working habits. Moreover, the required inputs to the system 
were felt to be time consuming. Therefore, the planning features need investigation with respect to the 
new role of controller in the planning and negotiation process. The interactions with the system 
possibly combined with hand-over procedures between control units should be reviewed. 
 
The non-acceptance of the planning interactions by controllers leads to a dilemma, because planning 
support by the system is a prerequisite to several A -SMGCS functions. Guidance support and several 
Control Functions are only possible if routes and movement plans are known to the system. The 
planning gap in the gate-to-gate management can only be closed if the A-SMGCS performs 
movement-planning functions. As long as the interaction with the system for the planning function is 
not accepted by the controllers, these planning functions cannot be provided by the A-SMGCS. 
3.3.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
In DEFAMM a generic functional A-SMGCS architecture of main functions was developed, 
comprising the A-SMGCS basic functions and required supporting functions. This general outline of 
the top-level functional decomposition was designed step by step and was reviewed with respect to 
suitability and applicability throughout the project. 
The goal of the development of the functional architecture was to find a structure that 
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• is clear, concise and evident 
• matches the four basic functions as described by the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual 
• allows scalability and adaptability to specific airport's needs 
• allows the assignment of modular subsystems to the functions 
• shows the main communication relations in the system 
The functional architecture leads to decomposition into the following main functions: 
• Surveillance 
 
o Non-cooperative sensors to detect all objects, 
 
o Cooperative sensors to clearly identify controlled vehicles and aircraft 
o Interfacing to external sources 
 
o ASDE 
 
o E-Scan ASDE 
 
o Mode S multilateration 
 
o DGPS 
 
o ASR 
 
• Guidance 
 
o Manual or automated switching of centreline light segments and stop-bars 
o Data link/On-Board display system for clearance negotiation and automated 
transmission of taxi plan and guidance commands 
o On-board display shows the mobile’s own position on the assigned route, and the 
negotiation on taxi plans (request clearance, receive clearance, accept clearance), and 
the cleared movement plan (taxi route and time slots) 
 
• Routing/Planning 
 
o The task of the controller will be to assess the plans provided by the system. 
 
o The controller can initiate the generation of taxi-plans, edit and accept plans proposed 
by the system and validate the plans by presentation on the screen of the Controller 
Working Position 
 
• Control 
 
o Associated with the Control function is the subsystem Conflict Handling which takes 
the whole traffic information from the Sensor Data Fusion and provides the complete 
and assessed traffic information to the Controller Working Position. This includes the 
information about all controlled (identified) mobiles and all non-controlled (non-
identified) objects, the information about traffic and plan deviation conflicts. 
 
• the Human Machine Interface Function 
• the two support functions Management and Communication 
 
EMMA 
State of the Art in A-SMGCS 
 
Save date: 2005-07-27 Public Page 24 
File Name: D111_SAD_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
Based of this functional structure the definition of subsystems and their assignment to each of the top-
level functions was done. 
3.3.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
A stringent engineering approach proved to be an essential precondition for the successful execution 
of such an ambitious project and the related demonstrations for reliable evaluations. Much care should 
be taken in future projects to select a 'best practice' methodology and to ensure the consequent 
progress of the work according to the chosen method. 
The Requirements Analysis and the related Use Case and Event Trace descriptions were a 
fundamental basis for the design as well as for the testing processes. The procedures and interactions 
developed during the analysis and design process of DEFAMM can form a good basis for further 
investigations and research activities in future programs whereby the interactions for the planning 
needs review and extra careful investigation. 
Simulation of new procedures is highly recommended for future projects to test proposed procedures 
under definite conditions. However, only tests with a physical realization of the system in an 
operational environment, as done in DEFAMM, can prove and verify the suitability of the selected 
solutions and the operational benefits. 
The DEFAMM system design and the modularity of the system have proven to be an optimal 
approach for the realization of a large-scale A-SMGCS implementation. The exemplary modular 
decomposition should be taken into account in future projects. 
The subsystems used in DEFAMM need careful improvement in order to develop from demonstration 
and prototype to operational systems. 
A specific issue for future gate-to-gate co-ordination of air traffic is additional investigation with 
respect to the planning functions. They have to solve the problem to find planning features and related 
interactions, which are accepted by controllers in their new role in the control process. 
The Final Summary Report of the DEFAMM Project is available on the EC web site. 
3.4 LEONARDO ‘Linking Existing ON ground, ARrival and Departure 
Operations’ 
3.4.1 Background and Objectives of LEONARDO project 
LEONARDO (Linking Existing ON ground, ARrival and Departure Operations’) is one of the 
contracts awarded by the European Commission - DG VII in the 5th R&D Framework Programme. 
The project duration was 24 months, starting at December 2001. 
 
An analysis of the current situation of airports and their surroundings shows that a series of 
circumstances affect the efficiency of airport operation management. The main problem that 
LEONARDO intended to solve is this lack of coordination and efficiency in the context of Airport 
Arrival, Departure and Ground movement and operations, which leads to unacceptable amounts of 
delays and operating costs. It is foreseen that the airport and its surroundings will become the main 
limiting factor of the whole ATM system. These circumstances, on which the LEONARDO Project 
focused, are the following: 
 
1. The lack of integration of the existing tools in operation that assist in the management of 
arrivals, departures and ground operations at the airport. All these tools used for the 
management of airport operations currently work independently. Each tool uses its own 
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criteria to optimise the operations it manages disregarding the information and criteria used by 
the others. In this circumstances only individual operations (i.e. arrivals, departures, stand 
operations, taxiing) are optimised, which does not mean the overall efficiency of the airport. 
 
2. The different actors involved in airport processes (e.g., air traffic controllers, airlines, airport 
operations centres and handling companies) do not always have all of the information they 
need when they need it and with a suitable level of reliability. An increased exchange of 
information between these actors could improve the management and planning of available 
resources. 
 
In this context, the main objective of the LEONARDO Project was “to define a method for and 
demonstrate the feasibility of integrating existing tools for arrival and departure-planning 
management, with those derived from the planning and routing function of the ground movement”.  
 
Thus, the project proposes the integration of the existing and new airport management tools and the 
implementation of the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) at the airport as the addressed solutions 
to be tested. 
 
Indeed, the integration of the different airport planning tools is part of the CDM concept. The level of 
the system integration will be the level of CDM addressed. For the integration, the first step is to 
accommodate arrivals and departures in the tactical operations. Further steps should aim at adapting 
the departures to the already existing airborne traffic, extending the time horizon to the pre-tactical 
phase of the planning process. The integration of arrival and departure management involving surface 
and gate management in both the pre-tactical and tactical planning phases is considered to optimise the 
use of the available resources and to provide the means to assure a stable throughput at the airport. 
 
With these proposed solutions an increase in Efficiency is expected. Safety and Capacity levels are 
also expected to be maintained or increased. These three are the validation objectives defined within 
LEONARDO. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, a full-scale integration of existing ground, arrival and departure 
planning and management tools was proposed to be performed at two European airports under real 
operating conditions to validate such a system. Shadow mode trials were conducted at Madrid/Barajas 
Airport and Paris/Charles de Gaulle Airport. The study was complemented by a Collaborative 
Decision-Making Multi-Agent benchmark in a simulated environment, performing real time 
simulations. 
 
The two first levels of integration, as defined in the CDM context, are covered by the local 
implementations (Barajas and Charles De Gaulle), whilst the first two and third level is fully addressed 
by the CDMMA approach.  
 
Additional objectives that have been considered in the Project are: 
 
• To explore and find both the strengths and the weaknesses of the solutions to be tested. 
 
• To evaluate the Shadow Mode technique at the airport environment used for the testing of 
airport management tools. 
 
• To establish general procedures and recommendations at the airport context that may be 
implemented at other European airports. 
 
• To set the basis for future developments and research on the area of CDM and airport context. 
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3.4.2 Results obtained 
According to the validation design, several validation trials were performed. Two sets of passive 
shadow-mode trials at the two airport sites (Madrid-Barajas and Paris-CDG) and several real-time 
simulations at Amsterdam were run. According to the defined validation scope, during the trials, 
results were obtained for the metrics and indicators defined to measure the achievement of the Safety, 
Capacity and Efficiency validation objectives. Metrics and indicators were analysed either by 
statistical or qualitative means, depending on whether the results had been obtained by quantitative 
data or by the qualitative appraisal of the potential users that had intervened. 
 
LEONARDO carried out both operational implementation and research-study. The operational 
concept addressed by LEONARDO was proposed as the final target of the study and was focused on 
medium term timeframe (2005-2010) for the first and second level of integration, and long-term (2010 
onwards) for third level of integration. However, the integration at Madrid Barajas and Paris Charles 
de Gaulle has been performed in the 2002-2003 timeframe. The CDMMA experimentation was 
focused on the third level of integration which is long-term timeframe. 
 
Although Efficiency has been the validation objective that has been analysed further in detail, some 
results have been obtained for Capacity and Safety validation objective. The importance given to the 
validation objectives depends on the expected results and on the validation techniques that have been 
used (i.e. shadow-mode and real time simulation). 
 
The results obtained at each of the experimentations, the analysis performed and the conclusions 
drawn are included at the three trials reports (D5.3.1, D5.3.2 and D5.3.3). This section synthesises the 
information included in these three reports to provide a common view of the results. 
3.4.2.1 Safety Results 
Regarding Safety of operations, the objective has been to demonstrate that the integration of planning 
systems and the new procedures that LEONARDO concept implies, would not decrease the safety 
levels on airport ground operations. 
 
Safety has been analysed through the subjective perception of the potential users that have been 
involved in the trials, ATC Controllers in this case. According to their perception, the airport CDM 
systems proposed by LEONARDO will not degrade the safety levels on ground or, even, it may 
contribute to improving operational safety in some specific situations: Ground controller will have a 
better situation awareness with the stand information, the Actual Landing Time ALDT, Actual In-
block Time AIBT or Managed Landing Time MLDT, thus it could prevent complicated situations that 
may occur on taxi areas. 
3.4.2.2 Capacity Results 
Regarding Capacity, the objective has been to demonstrate that aircraft operations would not decrease 
or even might increase at runway and ground.  
 
At the shadow mode trials, capacity has been analysed through the perception of the potential users of 
the workload and of the runway throughput. The results show that most controllers involved in the 
evaluation feel that the system would reduce the current number of co-ordinations and 
communications, and therefore reduce the controllers´ workload. In addition, the sharing of the CDM 
information will reduce the time used by the actors to make individual calculations, such as for 
example the time event estimations. 
 
From the real-time simulations, the Departure Controller visual workload was evaluated using eye 
tracking tool. The results obtained show that during the simulations performed without CDM systems, 
the departure controllers had significantly more tendencies to look at the active flight strips. Thus, it 
could be concluded that a significant reduction in the departure controller visual workload is achieved. 
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Since the aim of the DMAN is to improve the runway throughput. The use of an improved DMAN 
that uses CDM information will improve its reliability and thus its use by the controller. It will help to 
the throughput improvement. 
 
Real-time simulation trials have shown the effect on the runway throughput of the CDM integration of 
systems for mixed mode runway operations. No increase on arrival throughput has been detected, due 
to the fact that the flight demand was not high enough and the AMAN acts as the master, thus not 
affecting to the arrival flights. As higher priority was put on the runway optimisation, the stand 
planning got lower priority with aircraft waiting longer at the stand instead of waiting in front of the 
runway. The departure throughput on the runway is reduced due to the same AMAN-being-master 
fact. Finally, it has been shown that the departure throughput increases as far as the controllers adhere 
to the DMAN planning. 
3.4.2.3 Efficiency Results 
The objective has been to provide a quantifiable measurement of the efficiency benefits of the CDM 
integrated system and procedures proposed by LEONARDO. Main objectives addressed have been: 
 
• Improvement of Flight Estimate predictability (main events): 
o Landing-time predictability 
o In-Block time predictability 
o Off-Block time predictability 
o Take-Off time predictability 
 
• Improvement in the decision-making in the airline operations (e.g. handling operations): 
o In-Block time predictability 
o Take-Off time predictability 
o Slot Compliance assistance 
 
• Improvement in the decision-making in the airport authority operations (e.g. stand 
management): 
o In-Block time predictability 
o Off-Block time predictability 
 
• Improvement in the decision-making in the ATC operations: 
o Off-Block time predictability 
o Take-Off time predictability 
o Slot Compliance assistance 
 
• Improvement of schedule compliance (i.e. reduction of delays and regulations compliance) 
 
Results from the trials on these efficiency objectives are stated in the LEONARDO Final Report: 
3.4.3 Lessons learnt 
Regarding the planning and the execution of the project, it can be concluded that the initial planning of 
the project was not realistic. It is impossible to start up a research project, define an operational 
concept and define the requirements and specifications of a system in only 5 months. An important 
part of a research project is to detail how it proposes to solve the existing problem it addresses. This 
task required much investigation and analysis. In addition, when several companies are involved in 
this task, extra coordination work was needed. We did not plan it correctly and we had delays from the 
beginning of the project generated by the wrong planning of WP1 “Requirements and tool 
specifications”. 
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Regarding the validation issue some issues have arisen during the project and from them some lessons 
have been learnt: 
 
• The MAEVA validation methodology showed to be a valuable and structured method, 
although execution to its full extent fell outside the LEONARDO budget and planning. 
 
• Validation scope has been constrained by the selected validation techniques. From the initial 
validation objectives, related to Safety, Capacity and Safety, and through the top-down 
approach proposed by MAEVA a set of validation requirements were defined. Not all 
validation requirements have been met, many of them due to the fact that the validation 
techniques and platforms had been selected from the beginning of the project. They had to be 
specified on forehand because otherwise the contract would have been not clear enough 
regarding content and obligations. 
 
• Limitations and benefits of passive Shadow-Mode techniques for the validation: 
 
o Use operational information in a real environment. Useful for evaluating the reliability 
of the information provided by the system and the usability of the system, e.g. 
improvement of predictability of information. 
o Shadow-mode technique gives more credibility of results allowing testing the 
experimental system under operational environment. It also allows comparing the 
decisions of the shadow mode user with the decisions of a user without the tool on the 
very same traffic situation. 
o The system does not feed back the real operation, thus effect on the operations cannot 
be measured, such as capacity gains. This issue makes the evaluator need another 
complementary validation technique, such us simulation or judgemental techniques. 
 
• Limitations and benefits of Real-Time simulation techniques: 
 
o RTS is a good technique to complement shadow-mode trials. It can use real operations 
information and the effect on the operations can be evaluated; for example the effect 
on capacity. 
o Trials are performed in a simulated environment. It leads to a limited perception of the 
real situation for the evaluator.  
o It is difficult for users to validate an operational concept / system which is for 
medium-long term (quite different from the currently existing systems and 
procedures). A long time period is needed for the evaluators for training and 
familiarisation. With the time and budget of this project it was only possible to 
evaluate the concept of computer-support negotiation (CDMMA). 
 
Regarding the trials and the obtained results additional lessons were learnt: 
 
• LEONARDO experiments have been focused on demonstrating the benefits of information 
sharing and some degree of collaboration between tools, which are levels one and two of 
CDM. Results have been satisfactory; however we need to go further up to collaborative 
procedures and negotiation. 
 
• As stated above, benefits have been demonstrated to be achieved in general terms. But it is 
necessary to state that the change compared with the current situation has to be significant 
enough to fully demonstrate that the achievement of benefits can be used to improve the 
decision making process to implement new procedures. In some cases the benefit was not felt 
by the users as enough to help them in their operations. 
 
 
EMMA 
State of the Art in A-SMGCS 
 
Save date: 2005-07-27 Public Page 29 
File Name: D111_SAD_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
• New solutions, as the ones proposed by LEONARDO, can be seen from the potential users as 
not needed by them because their perception comes from the current operational procedures. 
Currently, existing procedures are adapted to current systems and currently existing 
information, so it is needed to change procedures and the way of working of people to make 
best use of potential benefits. For this reason, the solutions should be seen from the 
perspective of the new procedures proposed and then benefits could be evaluated. 
 
• Users during validation provided requirements in order to evolve the system and to develop 
new versions. It has been learnt that it is usually very difficult to obtain requirements from 
users by interviews (only with a pen a paper) and without any prototype. When users see for 
the first time the system/prototype is when they start to think on requirements. This is why 
quite a lot of requirements have been collected at the end of the project, during the trials. 
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3.4.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
The most relevant element considered within the LEONARDO project, in terms of A-SMGCS, is 
undoubtedly related to the Routing/Planning function. In fact one of the automated ATC auxiliary 
tools, integrated in the LEONARDO platform, on both the test sites, was the SMAN (Surface 
Manager). Furthermore, Parking and Station allocation Manager have been taken into account. 
 
 MAD: SMAN CDG: SMAN 
Status Conceptual 
Prototype 
Prototype 
Experimental 
Inputs Stand allocation 
Arrival Sequence 
Flight Plan 
 
 
CTOT 
Rapid exit node for arrivals 
Aircraft priorities 
 
Start Up request 
Departure sequence 
RWY entry point for departures 
Parking Allocation 
Landing Sequence 
Flight Plan  
Ground Radar Tracking  Information 
Runway assigned 
CTOT 
 
 
Queuing Time 
EOBT from the Airline 
Departure Sequence 
Outputs Taxi Duration/Routes 
 
 
 
Sequencing along the taxi routes (waiting times)  
Depending on the mode of functioning: 
Exit time of the model (EIBT for arr and time at the 
rwy entry point for dep) 
Entry time to the model (EOBT for dep) 
 
Taxiing Duration/Routes 
Current surface traffic progression/Flight Status 
Ramp access choice for departure runway 
Estimated Time to reach the departure runway 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated OBT Window 
EIBT 
Request Departure Runway Crossing Time  
 
 
Main Functionalities Taxi route allocation  
Taxi duration calculation for arrivals and departures 
either with forecasted or real data (when available) 
 
For departures, computation of optimum network entry 
time from network exit time (time at runway threshold) 
Taxi route allocation 
Taxi duration calculation for arrivals and departures 
 
 
Provide current traffic progression 
Choice the ramp access for departure runway 
Optimise the Departure Runway Crossing 
Optimisation Criteria Optimised taxi duration for the whole ground traffic  
Optimised taxi duration for an individual aircraft or 
group of them 
Minimum number of ground conflicts 
Other configurable priority functions to be defined  
 
Optimised taxi duration for an individual aircraft 
Operators ATC Tower No operators, only externals systems 
Init Events None, new data are incorporated at next iteration FPL initiated by Paris  FDPS for departures flights 
MLDT received by MAESTRO for arrival flights 
Time Window Configurable (about 20-30 minutes) From ~30 minutes before SOBT until Take-Off for 
departure flights 
From ~20 minutes before ALDT to AIBT for arrival 
flights 
Freeze Aircraft leaves the  stand (DEP)  
Aircraft actually reaches the rapid exit node (ARR) 
N/A, always update taxiing time estimates and traffic 
progression for the other external systems 
Re-Plan Periodic. Configurable re-plan period. As new data is 
available it is taken into account for the next iteration 
 
N/A, not a planning tool 
What-If No No 
Table 3-3 Surface Managers Comparison: Current Situation versus Expected Situation 
 
SMAN Status: 
 
At Madrid-Barajas, the SMAN is still under development. Up to now at Paris-CDG, the Surface 
Manager is part of AIDA, so only departure flights are taken into account. During the LEONARDO 
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project, the SMAN will become a self-contained fully experimental system independent of AIDA, 
taking into account departure flights as well as arrival flights. The Surface manager detailed just above 
is the ATC SMAN. 
 
Taxiway Network complexity: 
 
 At CDG, the taxiway network is very complicated and several routes are available to go from the stand 
to the runway. Sometimes, due to the taxiway congestion the shortest taxi route is not necessarily the 
fastest and the ground controller might request the flight to taxi on a longer taxi route. CDG SMAN 
defines by default the most used taxi route to go from the stand to the runway but CDG SMAN does 
not take into account the taxi congestion allowing to optimise the taxi duration.  
 
 On the contrary, Madrid Barajas taxiway system is organised in a simpler way. Given the stand area 
and the departure entry point or the arrival runway exit, the taxi route is almost fixed. MAD SMAN 
gives priority to the standard taxi route but is able to propose a slightly different alternative based on 
ground situation. 
 
Use of Ground Radar tracking information: 
 
 Unlike the CDG SMAN that needs the Ground Radar tracking information to keep on updating the 
taxi route and time if needed, the route allocation function of the Barajas SMAN does not use Ground 
Radar tracking information. However the time calculation function is more complex and takes into 
account ground congestion to provide the waiting times and points along the route. 
 
 MAD: CONOPER (SADAMA) CDG: SARIA 
Status Operational Operational 
Inputs Schedule Arrival Time (SIBT) 
Schedule Departure Time (SOBT) 
Estimated Arrival Time (EIBT) (SACTA updates) 
Estimated Departure Time (EOBT) 
Flight Information (A/C type; service type, rotation) 
Passenger number 
Schedule Arrival Time (SIBT) 
Schedule Departure Time (SOBT) 
Estimated Arrival Time (EIBT) – H10 at ADP 
Estimated Departure Time (EOBT) 
Flight Information (A/C type; service type, rotation) 
Passenger number 
Ground Tracking Radar picture 
CDG-Terminal 2 assigned Parking number & duration 
(from AFR) 
Outputs Assigned Parking number  
Actual Parking number (Manually input) 
Assigned Parking number & duration 
Actual Parking number & duration 
Main Functionalities Assign Parking 
Highlight parking conflicts and suggest solutions 
Assign Parking 
Highlight parking conflicts and suggest solutions 
Optimisation Criteria A/C type 
Service type (Schengen, international flight) 
Rotation (link arrival / departure flight) 
Passenger number 
Maximise apron utilisation 
A/C type 
Service type (Schengen, international flight) 
Rotation (link arrival / departure flight) 
Passenger number 
Operators Barajas CECOPS ADP Parking Managers 
Init Events 
 
Just before the beginning of the day 
All flight events are received in real-time and might 
revise the planning if needed. Initial planning is updated 
automatically depending on flight events received from 
SACTA and airline 
Just before the beginning of the day 
All flight events are received in real-time and might 
revise the planning if needed. 
Time Window From the beginning of the day 
Until the occupation of the parking 
From the beginning of the day 
Until the occupation of the parking 
Freeze Aircraft arrives at the stand Initial planning is not updating automatically 
Potential conflicts are highlighted and solutions are 
suggested. 
Operator manually updates the planning  
Re-Plan Manually but based on tool’ suggestions dependent of 
flight events 
Manually and depending on flight events 
What-If Yes, in an independent module No 
Table 3-4 Parking Managers Comparison: Current Situation versus Expected Situation 
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At both airports, SARIA and CONOPER are airport real time shared databases where there is 
available not only stand information, but all information regarding airport resources (boarding rooms, 
check-in desks baggage belts, etc). At both sites the airport tool to be integrated in LEONARDO is the 
database, since all information needed from the airport is available in these tools. 
 
At Paris-CDG, the module dedicated to the parking optimization is SAIGA, which is using constraint 
programming technology and intelligent search. SAIGA only assigns parking for CDG-Terminal 1, 
which is under ADP responsibility. ORA system assigns parking for CDG-Terminal 2 whose 
management has been delegated to Air France. ORA system has the same characteristics as SAIGA. 
However, only SARIA will be integrated since it receives in real-time all parking assignments from 
SAIGA and ORA and it are able to forward them to any external systems. 
 
 MAD: GEA CDG: ATOM 
Status Operational Operational 
Inputs All flight information is received from the FFS (Flight 
Following System), which in turn receives it from the 
SIRIO server. 
Modifications made by SIRIO users are updated in 
GEA. 
Flight operators may also introduce data manually (e.g. 
all doors closed) 
Flight information (A/C type, service type, arrival and 
departure flights link) 
Pax number and connecting pax number 
Scheduled Arrival Time (SIBT) 
Scheduled Departure Time (SIBT) 
Estimated Arrival Time (EIBT) 
Target Off Block Time (TOBT) 
Minimum Turn Around Duration (MTAP) 
Next Information (NI) 
Flight Disruption    
Actual Times (ALDT – AIBT – AOBT – ATOT) 
Resources information ( checking/boarding status) 
Assigned Parking Number & Duration (from ORA for 
CDG terminal 2 only) 
Outputs Flight information (callsign, origin, destination, A/C 
type, registration number) 
Scheduled Arrival Time (STA) 
Scheduled Departure Time (STD) 
Estimated Arrival Time (ETA) and Estimated Departure 
Time (ETD).  These fields contain flight status 
information such as all doors closed/off-block for 
departure, in-block/doors open for arrivals2 presented by 
means of a one-letter code. 
Boarding status   
Cause of delay 
Nº Passengers 
Other relevant information (e.g. change of a/c) 
Assigned Secondary Resources (checking zone, 
boarding gate, ...) 
Actual Secondary Resources 
Main Functionalities Support tool for on ground activities, i.e. handling, 
connection between arrivals and departures.   
Connect the arrival flight with departure flight 
Gather information coming from different systems such 
as Gaetan – Milord – Ora  and forwards these 
information to the operational systems Tvm Geode 
Assign the secondary resources 
Optimisation Criteria N/A Aircraft type 
Service type (Schengen, international flight) 
link arrival /departure flights link 
Operators Mainly CIC operators and manager.  OCC operators also 
count with GEA display. 
Flight managers 
Flight operators 
Init Events All changes related to FP and a/c, update the information The day before at noon 
All flight events are received in real-time and might 
revise the planning if needed 
Time Window Day information.  SIRIO has information of the current 
day + 2 following days 
The day before at noon 
Until 15 days 
Freeze No, shows real time data in video format N/A, always update information for the forward systems 
Re-Plan SIRIO carries out this task N/A, not a planning tool 
What-If No No 
Table 3-5 Station Managers Comparison: Current Situation versus Expected Situation 
                                                     
2 Off Block and Doors Closed messages are given at the same time (Off Block Time) thus being difficult to use 
Doors Closed event as alarm, trigger of other processes, etc. 
 
EMMA 
State of the Art in A-SMGCS 
 
Save date: 2005-07-27 Public Page 33 
File Name: D111_SAD_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
3.4.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
Some of the Applications involving SMAN tool and tested within the LEONARDO Project should be 
taken into account during the Emma2 project, when Planning and Routing functions are going to be 
considered in a more significant way. 
 
The Applications that should be considered relevant for EMMA are set out below: 
 
o Estimation of the In-Block Time 
o Estimation of the Off-Block Time 
o Estimation of the Take-Off Time 
 
All the public documentations produced inside the LEONARDO Project are available on the 
LEONARDO web site [18] 
3.5 A-SMGCS at Paris CDG airport 
3.5.1 General description of the airport 
3.5.1.1 Traffic 
Paris–Charles-de-Gaulle is the largest airport in France, and the first in Europe for aircraft movements. 
It is the 8th airport in the world for passenger traffic. 
 
In 2001 it had 48 million passengers, and 592 000 aircraft operations. 
Peak day in 2000: August 31 - 1662 aircraft movements (departures and arrivals). 
 
Paris–Charles-de-Gaulle is located in the North-East of Paris City, at about 40 km. 
 
Very near this airport, stands Le Bourget airport, which specialises in general aviation (corporate 
travel) and taxi flights: 50 000 IFR and 10 000 VFR flights in 2001 
 
In the south of the city is Paris’ other large commercial airport: Orly. 
• 25 million passengers 
• 250 000 flights 
 
They are all part of the large Paris TMA, and the ATC operations are handled by two approach 
centres, one in each airport. 
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3.5.1.2 TMA departures and arrivals 
The departures and arrivals are organised in the Paris area as this figure shows: 
Figure 3-1 Paris TMA Traffic 
The arrows show the number of daily flights for may 2002. The green ones are Charles-de-Gaulle 
traffic; the yellow ones are for Orly. 
 
It is easy to see from this picture that cumulative southern departures from all of Paris airports create a 
bottleneck in the en-route sectors. 
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3.5.1.3 Physical description 
 
The next figure shows the layout of the airport: 
 
Figure 3-2 CDG Platform 
Paris–Charles-de-Gaulle is made of 2 pairs of parallel runways. Independent operations are conducted 
between both pairs, and within each of them, one runway is dedicated to departures, and the other to 
arrivals. However, the northernmost runway is not yet operational, so its neighbour is operated in 
mixed mode since summer 2002. 
 
This configuration allows a peak capacity of 121 flights per hour. 
 
This layout can explain the high taxi-times on the airport: 
the average is around 20 minutes. 
 
There are two main terminals: 
• Terminal 2 is dedicated to Air France’s hub, and its partners 
• Terminal 1 handles most other airlines 
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3.5.2 ATC operational context 
3.5.2.1 Description 
3 different centres control air Traffic in the Paris area: 
 
• the Paris ATCC in charge of flights between the TMAs and the en-route phase 
• the Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle Approach control centre, responsible for the northern part of Paris 
TMA, dealing with approach for Charles-de-Gaulle and Le Bourget airports 
• the Orly Approach control centre, responsible for the southern part of Paris TMA, dealing with 
approach for Orly, Toussus and Villacoublay airports  
 
The two approaches, being closely linked, have to assume control for some flights that pass through 
their airspace coming from or going to airports on the other side. 
 
Charles-de-Gaulle airport is made of 4 runways. They are all east-west oriented, and organized as 2 
sets of 2 parallel runways. Both sets are completely independent. 
Within each set, the inner runway is dedicated to departures; the outer runway is dedicated to arrivals. 
 
Operations around the airport tend to be more and more separated between two geographical 
independent parts. The northern part is made of north runways, north arrivals, terminal 1 and its 
taxiways. The southern part is made of south runways, south arrivals, terminal 2 and its taxiways (see 
figure 1). 
 
On Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle airport, one approach room and two control towers, north and south, share 
responsibility for the area. 
In each of them, several Air Traffic Controllers working positions can be found. 
 
The Approach Room 
 
a) The COOR-INI 
 
The COOR-INI is responsible for data and telephone co-ordination between the ATCC arrival sectors 
and the INI positions. 
He manages transfer conditions with the ATCC planning controllers, writes this information down on 
the flight paper strip, along with Estimated Approach Time. He then delivers the strips to the 
appropriate INI controller. 
 
b) The INI 
 
The 2 INI, or initial controllers, assume control of arrival flights since the Initial Approach Fixes. 
They share the airspace as North and South areas. The North INI deals with aircraft coming from the 
North-East and North-West IAFs, the South INI deals with aircraft coming from the South-East and 
South -West IAFs. 
They take care of backwind procedures, and merge their two streams into a single one, then deliver it 
to the ITM. They also interchange flights that need to land on the opposite runway. 
 
c) The ITM 
 
The 2 ITM, or intermediate controllers, each handle one of the 2 streams of arrivals, and directs it to 
the ILS capture and the landing runway. 
 
d) The SEQ 
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The SEQ, or sequencer, is responsible for preparing the arrival sequences for both landing runways, 
plus the Le Bourget arrivals. All this is currently done with the Arrival Manager tool MAESTRO. 
The SEQ checks the tool’s propositions, makes the necessary arrangements, co-ordinates with the 
ATCC planning controllers the necessary speed reductions to avoid holding patterns. 
He balances traffic loads between both runways and optimizes the use of capacity. 
 
e) The DEP 
 
The DEP or departure controller takes control over flights right after take off. He directs them along 
their SID, spacing them out in order to deliver them properly to the ATCC. 
 
The North and South Towers 
 
a) The PVL 
 
The PVL (or pre-departure controller), located in the north Tower, is responsible for delivering the Pre 
Departure Clearance. The PVL controller in the north tower is in charge of clearances for all 
departures on the airport. 
After receiving a request from the pilot, either on the frequency or by data-link message, about 10 
minutes before the planned off-block, he first checks compliance with the ATFM slot. If correct, he 
will determine the departure runway and the SID, and input them in the system. 
He tries to balance traffic between both departure runways, and prevent overloads either on the ground 
or in the air. 
According to all this, he will then deliver authorization to start-up engines. 
 
b) The VA 
 
The VA or Annex Control Cab is specific to the south tower and terminal 2. It is responsible for apron 
traffic management. There can be up to 3 apron controllers in the VA. 
They give pushback clearances, direct departures to the apron exits and hand them over to ground 
control (SOL). 
They take control of arrivals around apron entry points and direct them to the gates. 
They manage holding for multiple pushback or apron congestion. 
 
c) The SOL 
 
The SOL, or ground controllers are in charge of ground movement on the airport. There can be up to 3 
ground controllers, with geographical separation of their areas of responsibility: one, for the northern 
terminals and taxiways, two for the southern terminals and taxiways, sharing it as east and west areas. 
The north and south parts are linked by two high-speed taxiways, where ground controllers hand 
traffic over. 
 
The north SOL gives the pushback or auto-departure clearance and checks the operations. He 
determines ground routing for departures and arrivals in the area, and directs pilots along these, 
managing crossings and conflicts. 
He organizes the departure sequence for the north runway, and assigns the runway entries, then hands 
the traffic over to the LOC. 
He manages arrivals up to the gate, including holding for gate availability, or apron congestion. 
 
The 2 south ground controllers are in charge of ground movement on the south taxiways, between 
apron and runway. 
One takes care of arrivals, after crossing of the departure runway up to the apron entries. 
The other organizes the departure sequence from apron exits to runway entries. 
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d) The LOC 
 
There are 2 LOC, or local controllers, each dealing with one set of runways. 
 
The north local controller takes care of final spacing, and gives landing clearance to arrivals. 
He manages aircraft in the departure queues, giving clearance for alignment and take-off. For this he 
takes into account gaps in the arrival sequence, ATFM slots, wake turbulence and SID dispatching. 
 
The south local controller is similar to the north local controller, except that he also manages arrivals 
crossing the departure runway. 
 
e) The Tower Manager 
 
The tower manager, located in the northern tower, organizes and supervises the operations for both 
towers and the approach room. 
He decides the arrival and departure capacities. He organizes priority between arrivals and departures 
according to traffic demand or congestion. 
He decides and organizes the changes of runway configurations, especially according to wind 
situation. 
 
3.5.3 A-SMGCS functions/technologies implemented 
 
1. Which systems/components are installed? 
 
A-SMGCS Level 2: surveillance functions + SCA functions 
ASR: 3 STR installed (Flight Radar Data Processing Systems)  
SMR: 4 SMR installed 
M-Lat (Mode-S): 18 transceivers and antennas 
Electronic Flight Strips (TWR and Apron): Discus system 
SCA system: RIMCAS system 
Vehicle tracking system (Mode-S): Syletrack system 
 
2. How are they connected? Functional Architecture? Connection to SDS? 
 
 
 
3 ASR 
Identified 
air target 
Identified 
ground target 
MLAT 4 SMR Syletrack
Unidentified 
ground target
Identified 
vehicles 
Data fusion 
RIMCAS 
CWP
Identified + 
unidentified 
targets 
Identified + 
unidentified 
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Figure 3-3 Functional Architecture at CDG 
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3. Which systems/functions are proofed/certified? 
 
At the present time, there is no certification process for ATC tools. However, all systems have 
verified and validated by ADP and STNA (DNA technical services) before use in an 
operational context 
 
4. Are they reliable? 
 
All systems are reliable: it is one of the criteria in the V&V process performed by ADP and 
STNA. All systems are available 24h a day. The redundancy of the system and of the sensors 
guarantees their availability. 
 
5. Existing Problems (which may be solved due to A-SMGCS EMMA)? 
 
In order to improve RIMCAS system, it is necessary to make the input surveillance data more 
reliable. False detection (fixed plot, grass, etc.) generate false alerts, which may have an 
impact on controller workload. EMMA project WP1.1 will help identify the main causes of 
false detection and false alerts and give recommendations for the improvement of the system. 
 
6. Data Resources – information flow between ACC –APP- TWR – Aprons –Airlines- 
Airport- etc. 
 
The following picture show the relationship between the airport partners (ACC-APP and TWR 
considered as a whole) (it is taken from Leonardo project: it is not A-SMGCS oriented, but there is 
few A-SMGCS information flows between airport partners. Relationships between ATC positions are 
explained in the other document) 
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Figure 3-4 Information flows between airport partners  
 
3.6 A-SMGCS at London-Heathrow airport 
This status report results from a site visit carried out by DLR on 22nd of July 2004.  
3.6.1 ATC Operational context at Heathrow 
3.6.1.1 Controller Working Positions at the Tower 
There are 10 controller working positions: 
 
• two Tower Controller    (TC1 + TC2),  
• two Ground Movement Controller  (GMC1 + GMC2),  
• two Ground Movement Planner  (GMP1 + GMP2), 
• two Light Board Assistant   (LB1 + LB2), 
• one Flight Strip Printer Assistant  (FS), and 
• one Supervisor Position 
 
In accordance to the runway configuration the TC positions can be adapted easily. With runway 
27R/27L in use the TC facing eastwards and with 09L/09R they are facing westwards by simply 
rotating their chairs by 180 degrees. This is easily manageable because there are two redundant CWP 
for each Tower Controller. TC1 is responsible for 09L/27R and TC2 is in charge either for 09R or 
27L. 
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With the Ground Movement Controller (GMC) and also the Light Board Assistants (LB) share the 
responsibility of the movements on the aerodrome: GMC1 and LB1 are responsible for northwest part 
whereas GMC2 and LB2 are responsible for the southeast part. With this work share it could happen 
that for a single flight 6 handover have to be performed. However, NATS controllers are used to it and 
estimate it very uncritical. 
 
The Ground Movement Planner (GMP) grants the departure clearance including SID, SSR Code, 
ATIS, RWY, und Start up Clearance. The GMP aims to establish the best sequence by granting the 
start-up clearance by close co-ordination with the Ground Movement Controller. 
 
All positions, except of LB and FS are equipped with A-SMGCS display. 
3.6.1.2 Adjacent Information Centres 
Gate Management 
The aerodrome movement control is completely performed by NATS from their Control Tower. There 
is a local Gate Management Centre that is managed by the Airport itself. The Gate Management has 
very close contact to the airlines to enable a very flexible gate allocation. Co-operations between 
NATS and the Gate Management are very loose as NATS is only interested in the result of the gate 
allocation process.  
 
Approach Control 
The Approach Centre is not situated at the airport but 1,5km away the airport. The arrival flight strips 
are printed out at the Tower 40 minutes in advance. They have no access to A-SMGCS information.   
 
Departure Control 
They are connected to the A-SMGCS – they are provided with the pushback event that helps them to 
manage the real capacity demand more in advance.  
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Figure 3-5: Controller Working Positions on Tower London Heathrow 
3.6.2 Aerodrome layout and predominating Runway configurations 
The predominating runway use is a single mode with runway 27L and 27R. Arrival runway and 
departure runway are equally alternated over the day to prevent noise concentrations to the 
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surrounding airport areas. RWY23 is not used anymore as a runway but as a taxiway. Runway 09L is 
not used for departures because of noise restrictions with an adjacent residential area. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Heathrow Aerodrome layout 
3.6.3 Current Procedures by using level II A-SMGCS 
NATS still applies usual SMGCS procedures by using the A-SMGCS as an additional monitoring 
means to support them with their control task. However, the system performance is rated as rather high 
and they could imagine using the system as the primary means for detection and identification. 
 
Labels on the gate are suppressed to prevent confusion by too many labels on the A-SMGCS screens. 
Too many labels are caused by plenty of movements and by pilots who forget to switch of their 
transponder after reaching the parking position. Further on, the probability of identification at the gate 
area is not as good as needed to rely on. If the aircraft is pushed out of the suppression area it is 
labelled automatically. 
 
3.6.4 Operational Systems at Heathrow 
3.6.4.1 Systems installed 
There are following systems installed by now (July/2004): 
 
2 ASR: There are two different ASR in the centre of the airport very close to each other. The 
radars are working with different wave length, range and accuracy. 
 
1 SMR: There is one Surveillance Movement Radar on top of the Tower building in the centre of 
the airport. 2 additional SMR outside the runways planned for 2005 
 
15 M-LAT antennas: 9 antennas outside of the runways, 6 inside, operational since November 
2000 
 
Electronic Flight Strips: There are no EFS for the time being. However, printed flight strips are 
aimed to be replaced by EFS when moving to the new Tower building. Software will be taken 
from NAV Canada, because London Stansted uses this software too. 
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SDS: The output of the surveillance data server is one position report per second. The incoming 
sensor information is weighted differently, e.g. MLAT is more significant than SMR 
information and SMR information are even suppressed with the alerting function. The SMR 
information is displayed to the ATCO without any filtering. The SDS is operational since 
November 2002. 
 
Vehicle tracking system (Mode-S): Very less vehicles equipped, i.e. there are also unequipped 
vehicles on the runway. At the moment they investigate the performance and the potential 
benefit of vehicles equipped with co-operative sensors. In case of positive results they want to 
equip more vehicles 
 
RIMCAS: For the moment the system is only used as an additional assistance system or an 
additional safety net. The system is not adapted to different visibility conditions. 
 
3.6.4.2 System Performance 
Surveillance 
Surveillance performance has not been measured objectively but it is estimated very high by the 
controllers. With the A-SMGCS display an algorithm has been established that prevents an 
overlapping of labels what is absolutely needed with the mass of departures. 
 
There is only one SMR on the top of the Tower building, so that the surrounding terminals cause 
shadows which impair the detection of non-cooperative target. With these areas only detection of co-
operative targets is possible (MLAT). Further on, buildings and parking aircraft cause shadows on the 
runways that appear as false targets occasionally. These surveillance lacks shall be treated with two 
additional SMRs that are built up in the centre outside the runways in 2005. 
 
ADS-B receiver is installed but not used due to interferences with ASR und SMR when processed by 
the SDS. Further on, inaccuracy with the sensor is assumed. NATS would estimate that 10 to 15 
percent of aircraft operating on London Heathrow are ADS-B equipped.  
 
The correct transponder operating procedures of the aircraft, as described with the Eurocontrol AIC, is 
regarded by the pilots by nearly 100%. If the transponder has not been set correctly, the controllers 
request the right transponder setting via radio. 
 
Alerting System 
Controllers are very satisfied with the RWY incursion alerting function (RIMCAS). The alerts are 
bounded to runway incursions only; there is neither a prediction nor taxiway conflict detection.  
 
Since the alerting performance is dependent on the quality of the surveillance they have also many 
false/unwanted targets that evoke unwanted alerts. False alerts are very disturbing at night and in LVC 
because they can hardly be verified or falsified by looking out of the window. Also double targets 
during take off that are caused by the same aircraft, are observed and release false alerts. That’s why 
NATS decided that the alerting function only bases on co-operative targets.  
 
Missed alerts, that is, a real conflict situation that has not been detected by the alert function, has never 
been observed. 
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Figure 3-7: Labelled Departure on RWY 27R 
 
3.6.4.3 Functional Architecture 
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Figure 3-8: Functional Architecture London Heathrow 
3.6.5 Safety Assessment  
Neither the system and nor parts of the system are approved or certified. There were no safety 
assessment of the A-SMGCS but they are interested in to do so. By a first step they are involved with 
the “Safety Case” performed by the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Group. 
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3.6.6 Current Constraints and Plans for the Future 
NATS stated that there are no current constraints in terms of traffic demand and capacity for the time 
being. Higher levels of A-SMGCS are not considered for the near future. The airport layout is judged 
as too complex to be coped by an automatic planning function. The same to CPDLC: it is not judged 
to be necessary for the near future.  
3.6.7 Ground Guidance Means 
There are green taxiway centre lines that can be switch from segment to segment. A segment is framed 
by two red stop bars. When a stop bars is set on to red, the green centre lights are illuminated 
automatically reaching from the local aircraft position up to the red stop bar. This kind of guidance is 
only used at night and in LVC. It is operated by two Light Board assistant whereas each of them 
monitors the GMC radio frequency northwest and southeast, respectively. 
3.6.8 Traffic amount 
On 22nd of July 2004, 860 movements have been registered. With peak days movements can increase 
up to 1200 a day. With peak hours there are 95 movements, 45 arrivals and 50 departures, and 
sometimes, but very exceptional 105 movements per hour. There is no defined capacity restriction. 
With 64 million Heathrow also operates the most passengers per year. The amount of slotted aircraft 
varies from day to day, sometimes only 30-40 flights. 
3.6.9 Miscellaneous  
Westward of the current Tower building a new Terminal T5 will be erected. In parallel a new Tower 
building, 97 Meter tall, is set up at the end of RWY23. When it is set up completely it will be moved 
to the centre.  
 
In the future NATS plans to extend the GMC to three positions with an assistant each who serve the 
light board on a plasma touch-screen panel. The old tower is then be used as a contingency position. 
3.7 Airport Surface Operations at Stockholm-Arlanda airport 
There are three different processes running in parallel and that are somewhat interconnected: 
3.7.1 ADS-B in Stockholm-Arlanda SMGCS 
 
The ADS-B implementation project at Arlanda has the purpose to increase safety on the airport by 
introducing a presentation of unique identity for each equipped vehicle and aircraft and make it 
possible for more efficient and easier ATCO work in position. 
 
The project has installed and made safety assessment for the following system: 
 
• 17 ADS-B transceivers installed in various different ground vehicles 
  
• 1 VDL Mode 4 CNS ground station for ADS-B reception and GNS-B transmissions (the GS is 
also able to transmit FIS-B and TIS-B information, but no safety assessment has been performed) 
 
• 1 reference transponder for verification of the position quality 
 
• 1 ADS-B server to be a link between the CNS GS and the HITT SMGCS system  
 
• An update of the existing HITT SMGCS system to fuse and display ADS-B and SMR information  
 
 
The introduction of ADS-B in the SMGCS at Arlanda has enabled the following benefits: 
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1) Labelling for vehicles that had none earlier,  
 
2) Improvement of surveillance coverage 
 
3) Automatic coupling to flight plan 
 
Initially there are no major changes in the regulation and the same working methodology is still valid 
for an SMR and ADS-B environment. In future scenario new procedures enabling more benefits for 
the ATCO can be used including the use the labels from a transceiver-based system. A prerequisite is 
that the majority of the vehicles and A/C are equipped and that thorough validation and safety 
assessments are performed. The validation activities and gained experience will show the correctness 
of the labels and the capability of the system components. If the experience is good the use of positive 
tagging as a means of detection can be used operationally.  
3.7.2 Airport Bus Coordination System at Stockholm-Arlanda airport 
At Stockholm-Arlanda airport 22 airport buses have had VDL Mode 4 ADS-B transceivers installed 
since almost two years back. This is in addition to the 17 vehicles mentioned above. 
 
There are two primary benefits coming from the equipage: 
  
• SAFETY: The ADS-B data transmitted from the airport buses are received by the SMGCS system 
above, making the ATC aware of the ID and the whereabouts of the buses. 
  
• EFFICIENCY: The VDL Mode 4 transceivers are also used to transmit and receive information 
about tasks for the bus driver. Every airport bus is equipped with a display connected to VDL 
Mode 4 transceiver. The information is presented in text format on the display, making it more 
easily to pick-up and confirm by the driver than by using the voice radio. On this display the 
driver receives the task he or she is supposed to carry out. 
 
The information can look like this: 
 
* Drive to Gate 53 at 13.30 h 
* Pick-up 58 passengers 
* Drive to Stand S12 
* Leave passengers at Flight SK341 
 
The driver’s task is assigned by a coordinator. After each of the steps above has been performed by the 
driver he or she confirms to the coordinator via pressing a button on the display. This way, the 
coordinator is always aware of the current status of a task.  
The coordinators position is directly connected to the airport database containing information about 
incoming and outgoing flights. The same database information is also available on the drivers display 
in the bus, broadcasted via VDL Mode 4. 
3.7.3 Nationwide ADS-B ground station network 
Currently there are two full-scale VDL Mode 4 ADS-B ground stations in Sweden, able to handle all 
downlink and uplink services such as ADS-B, GNS-B, TIS-B and FIS-B. In addition to these there's a 
network of another four stations but with limited functionality for experimental, pre-operational use. 
These experimental ground stations only support ADS-B and FIS-B. 
 
However, at this very time, another twelve full-scale VDL Mode 4 Ground stations are under 
procurement, supporting all downlink and uplink services in the twelve most important airports in 
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Sweden. In addition to full airport coverage at these twelve airports this will also give as good as 
100% ADS-B Surveillance Coverage En-Route and in most TMA's. 
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4 Review and Analysis of A-SMGCS related Programmes in 
US 
From an exhaustive literature and Internet search the following US (United States) programmes 
(R&D, pre-operational, and operational) on A-SMGCS (Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and 
Control System) have been found: 
 
• National Airspace System (NAS) 
• Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) 
• Advanced Taxiway Guidance System (ATGS) 
• Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP) 
• Runway Awareness & Advisory System (RAAS) 
 
One of the remarkable aspects found in the search is that the US programmes pay little attention to the 
operational aspects and the integration into the Tower environment. The reasoning behind this is 
probably laid in the fact that most of the US programmes are focussed on early benefits by deploying 
low-risk technology while maintaining or exceeding current levels of safety. So the safety critical 
operations are not changed and thus no focus on the operational aspects is necessary for the full 
extend. 
 
Furthermore, the US programmes not only focus on the large international airports with many 
operations, but also on the many smaller airports with still significant numbers of operations. For these 
smaller airports it is tried to come up with cheaper and simpler systems that still can increase safety 
levels to a level comparable to the larger airports. 
4.1 Programme National Airspace System (NAS) 
4.1.1 Background and Objectives of Programme NAS 
The National Airspace System (NAS) architecture [ref.6] is an evolutionary plan for modernising the 
NAS and moving toward Free Flight. It incorporates new technologies, procedures, and concepts to 
meet the needs of NAS users and service providers. The main objectives of the NAS modernisation 
are to provide existing services more efficiently and to provide new services and capabilities that will 
move the NAS toward Free Flight, which is focused on allowing users to achieve individual 
objectives. In this the safety will not be compromised, and costs to the FAA (Federal Aviation 
Administration) and users must be kept to a reasonable level. 
 
Airport Surface Operations are incorporated in the NAS architecture. The focus within the Airport 
Surface Operations Program is on new capabilities that improve low visibility surface operations, taxi 
sequencing and spacing, and weather and traffic situational awareness in both the tower and cockpit. 
Faster and more reliable user/provider communications will also be realised. The use of satellite-based 
navigation and automatic dependent surveillance technology, updated cockpit avionics, and data link 
will provide the means for safer and more efficient low-visibility surface movement of aircraft and 
ground vehicles. New traffic situational displays will allow pilots, service providers, and ground 
vehicle operators to maintain situational awareness of all moving aircraft and vehicle traffic in their 
areas. Automated conflict detection and surveillance of airport movement areas, runways, and 
surrounding airspace will allow service providers to monitor traffic and be alerted to possible runway 
incursions. Surface movement decision support systems will save time and fuel by identifying the 
most efficient taxi sequence and routes appropriate to the departure and arrival activities. Safety will 
be enhanced by reducing time between de-icing operations and departures. 
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From the high-level goals of the All Weather Operations Panel of the ICAO (International Civil 
Aeronautics Organisation) the following subset of Surface Movement Guidance and Control goals are 
applicable to the NAS architecture: 
• Pilots, controllers and vehicle operators should continue to have clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities that eliminate procedural ambiguities, which may lead to operational errors and 
deviations. 
• Improved means of providing situational awareness should be developed for pilots, controllers, 
and vehicle operators, considering visibility conditions, traffic density, and airport complexity. 
• Improved means of surveillance should be provided (beyond primary radar). 
• Delays in ground movement should be reduced, and growth in operations should be 
accommodated without increases in delays on the ground. 
• Surface movement functions should be able to accommodate all aircraft classes and necessary 
ground vehicles. 
• Improved guidance and procedures should be in place to allow: 
¾ Safe operations on the airport surface, considering visibility conditions, traffic density, and 
airport layout. 
¾ Pilots and vehicle operators to follow their assigned routes in a continuous, unambiguous, 
and reliable way. 
• Airport visual aids that provide guidance for surface movement should be integrated with the 
surface movement system. 
• Air traffic management automation should provide linkages between surface and terminal to 
produce a seamless, time-based operation with reduced controller and pilot workload. 
• Surface movement guidance and control improvements should be developed in a modular form 
and accommodate all airport types. 
• Conflict prediction/detection, analysis, and resolution should be provided. 
4.1.2 Results obtained 
Analysis of performance of surveillance systems [ref.7] showed that ADS-B (Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance - Broadcast) demonstrated best overall compliance with A-SMGCS performance 
requirements [ref.13] compared with multilateration and ASDE-3 (Airport Surface Detection 
Equipment – Type 3). ADS-B still needs to be augmented with non-cooperative surveillance sensor to 
provide surveillance of unauthorized targets and authorized aircraft and ground vehicles that are not 
equipped with ADS-B. Multilateration has the potential to identify aircraft, provide position aiding to 
the radar and support false target resolution. 
 
The SMS (Surface Management System) analyses [ref.10] showed that airline operators where mostly 
interested in aircraft position information, map display (surface and terminal), estimated gate arrival 
time, landing sequence, and departure queue length (now and predicted). The predecessor of SMS is 
SMA (Surface Movement Advisor) [ref.11]. The operational trials of SMA showed that it could 
reduce taxi out delays by 2 minutes per operation. 
 
Analyses of AMASS (Airport Movement Area Safety System) showed that the incursion alerts were 
often too late to be able to give the pilots enough time for evasive action. False alerts were a major 
problem for AMASS, resulting in the decision to remove part of the functionality of the system. 
Evaluation of the ASR-11 (Airport Surveillance Radar - Model 11) showed that it suffers from a 
significant number of false targets can be observed and that the number of dropped tracks is still an 
operational issue. 
4.1.3 Lessons learnt 
Experience from developing SMS has shown that involving the eventual users throughout the 
development process significantly benefits the quality, operational applicability, and usefulness of the 
final product. 
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Experience from the usage of SMA showed that even Customs and Immigration services could benefit 
from accurate and timely gate and arrival information. 
 
Providing warnings only to air traffic controllers unnecessarily increases the time to alert flight crews 
of a potential runway incursion or collision. A significant amount of time is required for the controller 
to detect the warning, identify the nature of the problem, and determine the necessary action before 
attempting to establish radio contact with the flight crew. The experience with AMASS regarding late 
alerts has resulted in the FAA looking for alternative solutions providing direct warnings to flight 
crews and other vehicle operators of potential incursions. 
4.1.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
Surface movement is both the first and last step in the progress of a flight through the NAS – National 
Airspace System [ref.6]. With no expected increase in the number of available runways or taxiways, 
the goal of the service provider, now and in 2005, is to remove system constraints on flights moving 
from pushback to the runway, and from the runway to the gate. Elimination of these constraints in 
2005 minimises the overall ground delay of arrivals and departures through implementation of the 
following system enhancements: 
• Expansion of data link capabilities to more users improves information exchange and co-
ordination activities. 
• Automation aids for dynamic planning of surface movements provide methods and incentives for 
collaborative problem-solving by users and service providers. This improves the management of 
excess demand through balanced taxiway usage and improved sequencing of aircraft to the 
departure threshold. 
• Integration of surface automation with departure and arrival automation facilitates the co-
ordination of all surface activities. Runway and taxiway assignments are based on projected 
arrival/departure runway loading and surface congestion, user runway preference and gate 
assignment, and environmental considerations such as noise abatement. Arrival runway and 
taxiway assignments are planned early in the arrival phase of flight. Departure assignments are 
made when the flight profile is filed, and updated accordingly until the time of pushback. 
• Improved planning that allows flights to depart immediately after de-icing improves both 
efficiency and safety. Automation to monitor and predict the movement of ground vehicles 
provides further safety enhancements through improved conflict advisories. 
 
Separation Assurance 
• Visual cues that service providers currently rely upon are augmented with enhanced situation 
displays and surface detection equipment to improve situation awareness. In addition, service 
providers can display satellite-derived position data transmitted by selected flights upon request, 
while ground-based surveillance data is shared with users as a safety enhancement for preventing 
incursions. Situation displays are available for airborne and surface traffic, with appropriate 
overlaps for viewing arriving and departing traffic. The surface situation display depicts the 
airport and nearby airspace, with data tags for all flights and vehicles, resulting in safer, more 
efficient operations in low visibility 
• Improved knowledge of aircraft intent allows automatic monitoring of taxi plan execution and 
provides alerts to the potential for runway incursions. 
4.1.4.1 Surveillance 
 
Technology ASDE-3: Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Type 3 - ASDE-3 provides 
primary radar surveillance of aircraft and airport service vehicles on the 
surface movement area. ASDE-3 is installed at the busiest U.S. airports. 
Radar monitoring of airport surface operations (ground movements of 
aircraft and other supporting vehicles) provides an effective means of 
directing and moving surface traffic. This is especially important during 
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periods of low visibility such as rain, fog, and night operations. The ASDE-3 
workstation is used to display the information to the controllers in the tower. 
ASDE-3 is currently operational at many US airports. 
 
ASR-11: The Airport Surveillance Radar- Model 11 is a digital, combined 
primary and secondary surveillance radar (SSR), short-range radar system 
with a 60 nautical mile (nmi) detection range for medium and small activity 
airports. The ASR-11 provides advanced digital primary radar including 
weather intensity surveillance with an integrated monopulse SSR system for 
use in the airport terminal area. The ASR-11 is used to detect and report the 
presence and location of an aircraft in a specific volume of airspace. The 
ASR-11 provides search radar surveillance coverage in controlled airspace 
primarily in terminal areas. ASR-11 is currently operational or being 
installed at some US airports. 
 
ATCBI-6: The Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator Model 6 is a ground-
based system that interrogates transponders, receives and processes replies 
from transponders, determines the range and azimuth to the aircraft, and 
forwards the information to appropriate air traffic control (ATC) automation 
systems. Replies provide identification and altitude data of the transponder. 
ATCBI-6 is currently being used at some US airports. 
 
ASDE-X: The Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X consists of a 
primary radar subsystem, multilateration subsystem, data fusion subsystem, 
and a display. ASDE-X will detect, identify and track targets; project target 
paths, and alert controllers to possible conflicts. Interfaces with other Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) automation systems will provide arrival aircraft data 
tag including position, and aircraft identification, and predicted runway 
information. ASDE-X is currently operational or being installed at some US 
airports. 
 
ADS: The Automatic Dependent Surveillance (Capstone) Ground Station 
(ADS (Cap) Ground Station) is a demonstration system used by the 
Capstone project under Safe Flight 21. It receives Global Positioning System 
(GPS)-derived aircraft four (4)-dimensional position data, aircraft 
identification, aircraft velocity, and other selected aircraft data for processing 
at ATC facilities, and transmits Traffic Information System - Broadcast 
(TIS-B) information on aircraft in areas of radar coverage (and other 
airspace status information when available) to properly equipped aircraft. 
These ground stations are located in remote locations in Alaska, and feed the 
Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC) automation system. 
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance (Safe Flight 21) Ground Station 
(ADS (SF-21) Ground Station) is a demonstration system used by the Ohio 
Valley project under the Safe Flight 21 program. It receives Global 
Positioning System (GPS)-derived aircraft four (4)-dimensional position 
data, aircraft identification, aircraft velocity, and other selected aircraft data 
for processing at selected ATC facilities, and transmits Traffic Information 
System - Broadcast (TIS-B) information on aircraft in areas of radar 
coverage (and other airspace status information when available) to properly 
equipped aircraft, to support SF-21 (Safe Flight 21) operational trials. These 
ground stations will be located in the regions surrounding Memphis 
(Tennessee) and Louisville (Kentucky), and interface with developmental 
surveillance processing systems. 
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4.1.4.2 Guidance 
N/a. 
4.1.4.3 Routing/Planning 
 
Technology SMA: The Surface Movement Advisor (Free Flight Phase 1) (SMA FFP1) is 
located at TRACONs (Terminal Radar Approach Control) and towers, and it 
has displays located at AOC s (Airline Operational Centre). It provides 
aircraft arrival information, including aircraft identification and position, to 
airline ramp towers and AOCs. Continual updates of touchdown times 
generated by SMA help airlines manage ground resources at the terminal 
more efficiently. SMA generates messages when flights transition from a 
Centre to a TRACON, when a flight is on final approach, and when a flight 
has touchdown. SMA calculates taxi time to the gate, estimated time of 
arrival at the gate, and estimated taxi time to take-off. AOCs provide SMA 
with information such as flight readiness status within minutes of departure. 
Finally, SMA can generate historical data on the true demand on departure 
capacity of the airport. SMA is currently operational at some major US 
airports. 
 
SMS: The Surface Management System Prototype (SMS Proto) provides 
surface management data feeds via ETMS (Enhanced Traffic Management 
System) interfaces to AOCs. The SMS Prototype main servers will be 
located at the ATCT/TRACON (Air Traffic Control Tower), with feeds to 
separate display processors located in Air Route Traffic Control Centre  
 - ARTCCs (Traffic Management Unit - TMUs), TRACONs (TMUs), 
Ground and Ramp areas of ATCTs. SMS data will include surface 
surveillance data, flight plan data, gate assignment information, downstream 
restrictions and air carrier predictions of flight push-back times. The SMS 
prototype is currently operational at Memphis airport. 
 
The functions of SMA and SMS will in future be combined in the Surface 
Traffic Management System (STMS). STMS may be enhanced to add 
communications via data link to the cockpit. The system is currently in the 
design phase. Initial operation is expected in 2008. 
4.1.4.4 Control 
 
Technology AMASS: The Airport Movement Area Safety System with ASDE provides 
controllers with automatically generated visual and aural alerts of potential 
runway incursions and other potential unsafe conditions. AMASS includes 
the Terminal Automation Interface Unit (TAIU) that processes arrival data 
from the airport surveillance radar. AMASS adds an automation 
enhancement to the ASDE-3 and tracks the movement of aircraft and ground 
vehicles on the airport surface and presents the data to the tower controllers 
via the ASDE display. AMASS is operational at many major US airports. 
4.1.4.5 Communication 
 
Technology Mode S: The Mode Select mechanism is a ground-based system capable of 
selective interrogation of Mode S transponders and general interrogation of 
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) transponders within 
range. The system also receives, processes, and forwards the transponder 
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replies to appropriate air traffic control (ATC) automation systems. Data 
formats include data exchange capabilities. Mode S ground-based systems 
are operational at many US airports. 
 
4.1.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
The planning information regarding arriving traffic can be used by Customs and Immigrations for 
better planning of their activities at an airport. This has an effect on security performance(The security 
aspect of A-SMGCS will probable get more emphasis in EMMA II). 
 
The development of AMASS has shown that the biggest benefits from runway incursion alerting tools 
are expected when they address the pilots and vehicle drivers directly. This gives them the longest 
time possible to react to the conflicting situation. 
4.2 Programme Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) 
4.2.1 Background and Objectives of Programme TAP 
The Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) program [ref.1] will increase the capacity of existing major US 
airports that experience delays in non-visual, or instrument meteorological conditions. TAP will 
increase capacity and reduce delays by reducing spacing requirements between aircraft approaching an 
airport and by expediting ground operations while meeting all FAA safety guidelines. The TAP 
program is focussed on airborne technology. 
 
One of the projects within the TAP- program is investigating increasing taxi speed at night and in low 
visibility conditions. This is done by a computer-generated vision in the cockpit of the runway and 
taxiway ahead, which may be provided by a Head-Up Display (HUD) and by a moving map of the 
airfield that shows the relative position of multiple aircraft. The same technology can be used to 
provide visual guidance and braking and turn advisories to the pilot to reduce time on the runway 
(ROTO – high-speed roll-out and turn-off). To further enhance the situational awareness, the T-NASA 
(Taxi Navigation and Situation Awareness) system utilises virtual acoustic (3-D audio) techniques to 
form a head-up auditory display for traffic advisories. 
 
The NASA-prototypes are being further developed to an operational product by Rockwell-Collins 
under the name of Surface Guidance System. 
4.2.2 Results obtained 
The T-NASA studies (part task simulations, high fidelity simulations, and real world flight tests) have 
demonstrated that: 
• An audio GCAS system (Ground Collision Avoidance System) in the cockpit would be useful for 
avoiding potential incursions under both normal and low visibility (RVR 300ft) conditions, and 
that an auditory system presenting incursion alerts would be a useful adjunct to a moving map 
display. 
• Relative to a baseline condition, the electronic moving map (EMM) yielded a non significant 
increase in taxi speed. The combination of the moving map and the HUD yielded a considerable 
larger and statistically significant increase in taxi speed. These results suggest that in low 
visibility, HUDs can substantially improve taxi performance, over and above improvements with 
moving maps. 
• Pilots made incorrect turns during the trials when only a paper chart was available. The T-NASA 
Electronic Moving Map reduced these errors during the trials, and with the full T-NASA EMM 
and HUD no incorrect turns were made. 
• Pilots noted that T-NASA improved communications with ground control and between crew 
members, in that less communication was needed and communications were clearer. 
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The ROTO studies have demonstrated that: 
• The ROTO guidance and information system in the cockpit can reduce runway occupancy time 
(ROT) of transport aircraft in low-visibility operations. 
• When using the ROTO system, runway occupancy time was insensitive to the visibility levels 
tested (300 and 1200 ft RVR – Runway Visual Range). 
4.2.3 Lessons learnt 
The T-NASA studies have come with the following lessons learnt: 
• The ultimate goal of T-NASA to increase taxi throughput under low-visibility conditions, was not 
demonstrated. Notwithstanding, based on the positive results obtained in clear-weather night 
conditions, the designers are confident that T-NASA will safely enable VMC (Visual 
Meteorological Conditions) capacities in IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions). 
• The use of data link for clearances can have adverse effects on clearance error detection and 
response times to clearances. This needs to be taken into account when designing procedures 
making use of data linked clearances. 
 
The ROTO studies have come with the following recommendations: 
• Coordination between the company/gate and ROTO would be useful so that ROTO can receive 
and distribute information about the most optimal exit and runway exit side. 
• Pilots disapproved of ROTO providing guidance to encourage high speed exits in low visibility 
conditions. 
4.2.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
4.2.4.1 Surveillance 
N/a. 
4.2.4.2 Guidance 
 
Description The ROTO system provides the pilot with deceleration and centreline 
tracking guidance and situational information on a HUD to perform the 
rollout and turnoff operation. Prior to touchdown, the system allows for 
manual or automatic exit selection. After touchdown, the system provides 
predictive-and-control HUD graphics for deceleration to the turnoff speed of 
the selected exit and subsequent exit steering. 
Technology T- NASA (Taxi Navigation and Situation Awareness) System - This system 
has the following guidance components: 
1. Moving Map - airport taxi chart with route, and own-ship and traffic 
location; 
2. Scene- Linked Symbology - route/taxi information virtually projected via 
a HUD onto the forward scene. 
 
ROTO (high-speed roll-out and turn-off) System – This system informs the 
pilot via a HUD on roll-out and turn-off operations.  
4.2.4.3 Routing/Planning 
 
Technology T- NASA (Taxi Navigation and Situation Awareness) System - This system 
has the following routing component: 
1. Moving Map - airport taxi chart with route, and own-ship and traffic 
location. The route information is the cleared taxi route transmitted via data 
link. The route is available in text format and as visual representation on the 
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EMM. 
4.2.4.4 Control 
 
Technology T- NASA (Taxi Navigation and Situation Awareness) System - This system 
has the following control component: 
3-D Audio Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS) and navigation 
system - spatially localised auditory traffic and navigation alerts. 
4.2.4.5 Communication 
 
Procedures The T-NASA system was making use of data link capabilities for 
transmitting taxi clearances. Two types of procedures were investigated with 
various data link/voice usage mixtures: 
• Ground taxi clearances 
• Airborne taxi clearances 
The airborne taxi clearance makes it possible to move workload in planning 
taxi operations to the airborne part of the flight. 
4.2.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
In the T-NASA trials, it was found that the Electronic Moving Map (without Head-Up Display) did 
not increase the taxi speed compared to a paper map system. It reduced the number of wrong turns 
though. The safety aspect should be the focus for the EMMA Electronic Moving Map concept as no 
gains are expected regarding taxi throughput. Within the T-NASA trials, the safety was tested by 
focussing on taxi route deviations. 
 
Useful efficiency improvements can be expected with EMM though, when procedures are changed 
such that taxi clearances are given airborne. This improves situational awareness on the ground and 
decisions by the pilot regarding the runway exit to take after landing. Immediately after landing the 
taxiing via the correct route can start. This change of procedures is probable more of an option when 
A-SMGCS has matured and not yet within the EMMA context. Such a change is not necessary for the 
implementation of EMM. 
4.3 Programme Advanced Taxiway Guidance System (ATGS) 
4.3.1 Background and Objectives of Programme ATGS 
The Advanced Taxiway Guidance System (ATGS) [ref.2] is a prototype designed to provide improved 
airport surface guidance to pilots through automatically controlled taxiway lighting. The purpose of 
this FAA project is to investigate the feasibility of automatically controlled taxiway lighting systems 
to meet certain A-SMGCS operational requirements. 
4.3.2 Results obtained 
There are indications that implementation of an ATGS would help to improve airport/aircraft safety by 
eliminating incorrect taxiing turns and runway incursions, particularly in night and/or low-visibility 
operations. 
4.3.3 Lessons learnt 
The set-up with microwave barrier detectors was such that sometimes vehicles left the controlled area 
without the system detecting this. This meant that manually flight objects had to be removed form the 
ATGS system. Improvements are expected with the introduction of ASDE/AMASS input. 
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4.3.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
4.3.4.1 Surveillance 
 
Description There are microwave barrier detectors located throughout the test bed. When 
an aircraft passes through a detector, a signal is sent to the system indicating 
that the aircraft has passed that particular location. This information is 
shown as the aircraft’s location on the HMI (Human Machine Interface) 
panel. 
Next to that there is a radio frequency identification system (RFID). This 
system is installed within the test bed area and is used to uniquely identify 
aircraft without the use of radar. The RFID system consists of reader units, 
antennas, and the identification tags that were installed on the test aircraft. 
The id information is sent to the host computer and is shown with the 
location information on the HMI panel. 
4.3.4.2 Guidance 
 
Description The host computer is the master controller of the entire ATGS system. It 
receives aircraft location, identification, and direction of travel information 
from sensors located with the taxiway test bed. The Air Traffic Controller 
enters the cleared routing manually. Based on the input from the sensors, the 
host computer determines which groups of taxiway lights need to be 
illuminated to provide the necessary visual guidance to the aircraft’s 
destination. The lighting control computer turns on and off illuminated 
taxiway segments on commands of the host computer. The HMI panel shows 
the illuminated taxiway segments. 
4.3.4.3 Routing/Planning 
 
Description The taxi routing is manually entered in the host computer system by the 
controller. Next to that the routing is given to the pilot via voice 
communications. 
4.3.4.4 Control 
 
Description Based on the sensor input, the host computer detects potential taxiway 
routing conflicts between aircraft and incorrect aircraft turns. The HMI panel 
provides warnings to the air traffic controller in case of deviations from the 
assigned taxi route. 
4.3.4.5 Communication 
N/a. 
4.3.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
The results of the ATGS evaluation suggest that the improvements can be found in low-visibility and 
night conditions. The low-visibility and night conditions should be the focus for the EMMA 
investigations regarding guidance systems as there most likely the improvements can be found. 
 
The ATGS system has shown that guidance systems can only work in practice when the surveillance 
function is adequate. When the surveillance is not correct the guidance is not correct either or not 
present at all. 
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4.4 Programme Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP) 
4.4.1 Background and Objectives of Programme RIRP 
The Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP) is a research and development program aimed at 
identifying and maturing technologies with potential for reducing runway incursions. Current research 
and development efforts include a mix of dependent and independent technology development 
projects. The RIRP addresses runway safety technology initiatives required and sponsored by the FAA 
Runway Safety Program Office (ARI). Within the scope of this program, evaluation projects are 
underway to assess the technical and operational suitability of new concepts in surface traffic 
surveillance, as well as pilot and controller situational awareness tools. 
 
The following RIRP tools are described in this chapter: 
• Loop Technology (LOT) 
• Runway Status Lights (RWSL) 
• Ground Marker 
• PathProx 
• Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) 
 
4.4.2 Results obtained 
LOT 
• Initial evaluations have demonstrated that LOT (Loop Technology) can provide reliable aircraft 
and ground vehicle detection. 
• Airport surface surveillance required large loop sizes which places demands on detector sensitivity 
performance. Sufficient sensitivity is required to ensure reliable detection and classification. 
 
RWSL 
• Earlier RWSL (Runway Status Lights) projects concluded that a RWSL system is feasible, 
provided there are substantial improvements in the performance of the underlying surveillance 
system. 
 
Ground Marker 
• No results are yet available. The system is still under evaluation. 
 
PathProx 
• The concept of onboard runway incursion alerting is feasible 
• The alert logic performance is very dependent on the performance of the traffic and ownship 
position information. This information must be reliable, timely and accurate to ensure optimum 
runway incursion alerting performance. Especially the traffic information using STIS-B (Surface 
Traffic Information Service – Broadcast) and ADS-B showed erroneous position reports. 
Indications are that the maturity of the prototype systems involved played a significant role in the 
availability and integrity of the traffic data. 
 
FAROS 
• The FAROS system has proven that a simple and easy to understand system can take pilots more 
into the loop for detecting runway incursions. 
• Pilots have indicated that they think that the system will improve runway safety. 
4.4.3 Lessons learnt 
LOT 
Single loop detection of direction of travel is not possible. For this always a double loop is necessary. 
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RWSL 
In simulation sessions, all crews one time or another did a take-off after the runway controller gave 
them a take-off clearance despite the fact that the runway status light was indicating an occupied 
runway due to a crossing aircraft. This indicates that these kinds of systems must have appropriate 
interfaces to humans to be noticed when necessary. Pilot training focussing on the difference between 
take-off clearance and runway status is also important. 
 
Early involvement of users in the design process of systems will result in more effective systems. 
 
The system must ensure that users will not misinterpret the state of the lights to denote clearance. This 
factor could prove fatal to the effectiveness and conceivably cause additional incursion situations. 
 
Ground Marker 
The system is still under evaluation. 
 
PathProx 
Verification of the traffic data is probable needed to better handle erroneous information. 
 
In some cases pilots elected to initiate the go-around when they received only a Runway Traffic Alert 
and not yet the Runway Conflict Alert. A Runway Traffic Alert is generated when own aircraft is 
either projected to be involved in a runway incursion with other traffic that does not yet require 
evasive action. A Runway Conflict Alert is provided when a runway incursion has been detected, and 
there is potential for collision. An RCA indicates that the aircraft involved in the conflict needs to take 
evasive action to avoid the potential collision. 
 
FAROS 
General aviation aircraft on a runway are hard to see from the rear. This is true for various visibility 
conditions. A system to inform pilots on occupation of the runway lets the pilots look harder for the 
occupying aircraft. 
4.4.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
4.4.4.1 Surveillance 
 
Description Loop Technology - The FAA is evaluating Loop Technology (LOT) [ref.8] 
for its surface surveillance applications, where ASDE-type equipment will 
not be installed. LOT is a non-cooperative surveillance system, which does 
not need new aircraft equipage to work. The inductive loop technology 
allows for aircraft/vehicle detection and classification by using the inductive 
signature. Double loops can identify direction of travel and speed. 
Air traffic controllers can use LOT to aid in minimising the risk of incursion 
incidents and improve situational awareness. In addition to providing an 
operational display of surface traffic where loops are installed, LOT can 
provide the following capabilities: runway safety zone violation, standard 
taxi route conformance monitoring, blind spot monitoring, and monitoring of 
troublesome intersections. The system will be used by local and ground 
controllers to augment visual observations of aircraft. 
4.4.4.2 Guidance 
 
Description Ground Marker System - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is 
currently evaluating the Ground Marker System [ref.3] for signs of 
improvement in pilot situational awareness. By sending a voice message to 
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pilots over the 75MHz marker beacon frequency, pilots are informed of their 
exact location on the airport surface. The system consists of an antenna, a 
transmitter, a set of inductive loops, and a laptop computer. No new avionics 
are necessary to utilise this system. The message is send upward, so only the 
aircraft passing over the antenna/inductive loop is receiving the voice 
message. 
 
Runway Status Lights (RWSL) is a radar-based safety system to prevent 
runway incursions and/or high-hazard situations involving the runway. 
RWSL is comprised of a set of automatically controlled runway status lights 
designed to improve situational awareness of the runways' status by 
informing pilots and ground vehicle operators when a runway is unsafe to 
enter/cross or to begin takeoff. The system does not replace the clearances of 
the controller, but gives additional information on the runway status to the 
pilot or vehicle drivers. 
Technology Ground Marker provides aural notification to taxiing pilots by means of the 
75 MHz marker beacon frequency. The Ground Marker system consists of 
sensor areas or nodes. The nodes are located at historically significant areas 
(hot spots) where runway incursions are likely to happen. An aircraft passing 
over the node will hear a brief message broadcast via the marker beacon 
frequency. The message is informational only and does not contain any 
control information. It may be as simple as “Taxiway Bravo at Taxiway 
Alpha”. The intent of the message is to simply make the pilot aware of 
his/her position on the airfield. For Ground Marker, no additional equipment 
beyond a standard marker beacon receiver is required in the aircraft. 
Dedicated receivers are available for ground vehicles. 
The nodes physically consist of sensors buried in the taxiway pavement, a 
small computer and a transmitter. The sensors are very similar to those used 
for traffic light signals. They are able to sense the direction of the aircraft 
and to a limited extent, the speed. The content of the message may need to 
be vastly different depending upon which way the aircraft is headed. By 
sensing the direction of the aircraft an appropriate message can be broadcast. 
4.4.4.3 Routing/Planning 
N/a. 
4.4.4.4 Control 
 
Description Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) - The FAROS system 
[ref.3] will be used to provide warning to aircraft pilots on final approach 
when other aircraft or vehicles are actively on the runway. 
The concept behind the FAROS system is to use the normal Precision 
Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) already at the airport and overlay runway 
occupancy information onto the standard guidance information. By flashing 
the PAPI lights when a critical area on the runway is determined to be 
occupied, the pilot gains an immediate safety warning while still receiving 
guidance information from the PAPI lights. 
 
Runway Status Lights - The RWSL program [ref.4] will develop and test a 
software system that accepts fused surface radar and multilateration 
surveillance inputs to activate lights at runway/taxiway intersection points 
and runway take-off hold areas to help prevent incursions. 
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PathProx - The ASDE-3/AMASS technology developed by FAA to prevent 
runway incursions has two important drawbacks: it is only installed at a 
limited number of airports and valuable time is lost, because the pilot is not 
directly informed on the incursion, but indirectly through the controller. To 
address these issues, the responsible manufacturer is developing PathProx 
[ref.5]. 
PathProx is an on-board surveillance system designed to identify early 
conditions for runway incursions and provide aircraft pilots and ground 
vehicle operators with sufficient time to avoid runway incursions and 
collisions. 
Technology PathProx requires traffic information to be supplied by either TIS-B (Traffic 
Information Service – Broadcast) or ADS-B receivers. The alerting logic is 
the core of the PathProx algorithms. PathProx also needs a method for 
annunciating the alerts. In a first setup with NASA, the alerts are presented 
in three ways: on a HUD (Head Up Display), on a Navigational Display 
(ND), and via an Audio Alert System. Township position determination was 
provided by differential corrected GPS (Global Positioning System), LAAS 
(Local Area Augmentation System), and the Inertial Navigation System. 
4.4.4.5 Communication 
N/a. 
4.4.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
Onboard runway incursion alerting can have a major advantage over ground-based runway incursion 
alerting systems. Valuable time for resolving the runway incursion is not wasted to communications 
between the controller and the pilot. 
4.5 Programme Runway Awareness & Advisory System (RAAS) 
4.5.1 Background and Objectives of Programme RAAS 
Analysis of actual runway incursion events showed that the most common primary cause of an 
incursion is loss of position awareness. This resulted in the development within Honeywell of an 
extension to their EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System) called Runway Awareness 
& Advisory System (RAAS) [ref.12]. 
RAAS sits inside the EGPWS database and makes use of the runway information within the system 
and links to the aircraft’s GPS. It is an advisory system giving oral warnings. Examples are: 
“Approach Three-Four Left” when approaching a runway and “Thousand remaining” when doing a 
rejected take-off. 
4.5.2 Results obtained 
Nearly two-thirds of all runway incursion incidents and accidents could be avoided with RAAS based 
on own estimates of a well known Manufacturers. The system will be included with the EGPWS after 
FAA certification. 
4.5.3 Lessons learnt 
• Advisories are suppressed between 550 and 450 feet AFE (Above Field Elevation) to allow crew 
altitude call-outs. 
• The existing charts with runway data can sometimes be wrong. It has been found that runways can 
be up to half a mile away from where the charts say they are. The runway information needs to be 
validated and verified with each runway. 
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4.5.4 A-SMGCS Operational concept applied 
4.5.4.1 Surveillance 
N/a. 
4.5.4.2 Guidance 
N/a. 
4.5.4.3 Routing/Planning 
N/a. 
4.5.4.4 Control 
 
Procedures The system gives only advisories via oral warnings. The pilot still has to 
make all the decisions. Three types of advisories can be given: 
 
The following routine advisories are given: 
• Approaching Runway (on ground) 
• On Runway (on ground) 
• Approaching Runway (in air) 
Directly addresses flight crew position awareness relative to runways during 
ground operations and on approach to land. 
 
The following semi-routine advisories can be given: 
• Landing / Roll-out distance remaining advisory 
• Runway end advisory 
Addresses flight crew position awareness during operations on a runway 
(landing/ roll-out/ exit/ back-taxi) 
 
The following non-routine advisories can be given: 
• Intersection departure / insufficient runway 
• Approaching short runway (in air) 
• Extended holding on runway 
• Taxi-way take-off 
• Rejected take-off (RTO) 
Addresses ‘high-profile’ runway incursions. These come from scenarios that 
tend to be part of most runway incursion incidents and accidents. It also 
addresses runway ‘excursions’ due to runway length and RTO scenarios. 
4.5.4.5 Communication 
N/a. 
4.5.5 Useful considerations for EMMA Concept 
The use of simple and practical systems can already address a great number of causes for incursions. 
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5 Conclusions 
The main inputs for the EMMA project, coming from the above mentioned activities, concern both 
testing procedures and systems’ implementation issues. 
 
The BETA project, including man-in-the-loop simulator sessions for prototype evaluation and 
controller training, confirmed that field-testing requires complementary simulator exercises, in order 
to be able to extended testing and training activities with higher traffic density and more safety-related 
scenarios than possible during on-site trials at airports. The most relevant aspect concerning A-
SMGCS implementation at the airport is the acceptability of the HMI by the end-users of the system. 
Any improvements/modifications of new HMIs should be evaluated by the end-users throughout the 
development cycle prior to operational implementation. 
 
A clear understanding provided by more than one previous research activities is that the performance 
of the Surveillance function has to be tested accurately before starting the implementation of A-
SMGCS higher levels, avoiding limitations on the performance and usability of the other components 
of the system. An assessment would then be required to determine whether the level of surveillance is 
adequate for the type of A-SMGCS being implemented or whether the extension or addition of another 
sensor system is necessary. The ATGS system has shown that guidance systems can only work in 
practice when the surveillance function is adequate, respecting the existing MOPS. 
 
One of the major conclusions is that an A-SMGCS implementation  needs to be flexible and to allow 
for future system developments to be introduced progressively as regulations and operational 
specifications become defined and that the integration of on -board capabilities/performances into the 
A-SMGCS operational requirements is really necessary. This aspect is particularly significant for the 
second phase of the EMMA project during which activities should be focused on the integration of 
new components both On-ground and On-board. Systems’ flexibility and compatibility is a major 
aspect to be taken into account implementing higher A-SMGCS levels.    
 
The ATOPS testing activities and the obtained results, drive to the conclusion that the potential 
increasing of movements on the airport surface in low visibility conditions, has to be investigated not 
only by a qualitative point of view but figures about the traffic amount have to be collected during the 
trials. Moreover, the definition of new Operational Procedures has to be carried out through a constant 
collaboration with operational people (ATCOs/pilots). 
The DEFAMM project, as well, highlighted that even if simulation of new procedures is highly 
recommended, to test proposed procedures under definite conditions, only tests with a physical 
realization of the system in an operational environment, can prove and verify the suitability of the 
selected solutions and the operational benefits. This is the approach that has been mostly applied at the 
three Test Sites within the EMMA context, where Tests On-site will be performed following main 
outputs of RTS. 
The development of AMASS and the RIRP programme have both shown that the biggest benefits 
from runway incursion alerting tools are expected when they address the pilots and vehicle drivers 
directly. This gives them the longest time possible to react to the conflicting situation. Onboard 
runway incursion alerting can have a major advantage over ground-based runway incursion alerting 
systems. Valuable time for resolving the runway incursion is not wasted to communications between 
the controller and the pilot. 
 
Taxi route deviations have been analysed during the T-NASA trials in order to prove that the 
implementation of the Electronic Moving Map concept associated with Head-Up Display is an 
irrefutable way to increase safety level during surface operations. It was found that the Electronic 
Moving Map (without) did not increase the taxi speed compared to a paper map system. It reduced the 
 
EMMA 
State of the Art in A-SMGCS 
 
Save date: 2005-07-27 Public Page 64 
File Name: D111_SAD_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
number of wrong turns though. The safety aspect should be the focus for the EMMA even if taxi 
throughput should be analysed in the second phase of the project during which tools for Taxi Planning 
management should be integrated to increase the Efficiency of taxiing operations. 
 
Implementation of an operational A-SMGCS is also closely associated with developments in other 
areas of Air Traffic Management, most notably where the A-SMGCS functions are dependent on the 
equipment status of the aircraft and vehicles. This includes aspects such as the use of data link for 
clearances and the application of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B). The 
Stockholm-Arlanda airport can be considered a valid example for this kind of implementation 
especially concerning Vehicle Management Systems.  
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6 Available Manuals, Documentations and Standards 
6.1 ICAO 
6.1.1 The ICAO’s role 
One of ICAO's chief activities is standardisation, the establishment of international standards, 
recommended practices and procedures covering the technical fields of aviation: licensing of 
personnel, rules of the air, aeronautical meteorology, aeronautical charts, units of measurement, 
operation of aircraft, nationality and registration marks, airworthiness, aeronautical 
telecommunications, air traffic services, search and rescue, aircraft accident investigation, aerodromes, 
aeronautical information services, aircraft noise and engine missions, security and the safe transport of 
dangerous goods. After a standard is adopted it is put into effect by each ICAO contracting State in its 
own territories. As aviation technology continues to develop rapidly, the Standards are kept under 
constant review and amended as necessary.  
 
In keeping pace with the rapid development of international civil aviation, ICAO is conscious of the 
need to adopt in its specifications modern systems and techniques. 
 
Guidance Material is produced to supplement the SARPS and PANS and to facilitate their 
implementation. Guidance material is issued as Attachments to Annexes or in separate documents 
such manuals, circulars and lists of designators/addresses. Usually it is approved at the same time as 
the related SARPS are adopted.  
 
Manuals provide information to supplement and/or amplify the Standards and Recommended 
Practices and Procedures for Air Navigation Services. They are specifically designed to facilitate 
implementation and are amended periodically to ensure their contents reflect current practices and 
procedures. 
6.1.1.1 Available Manuals/Standards/Documentations 
 
¾ Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems Manual (A-SMGCS), 
Doc 9830 AN/452, first edition 2004. 
 
The systems described in the ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and 
Control Systems (SMGCS), (Doc 9476) are not always capable of providing the 
necessary support to aircraft operations in order to maintain required capacity and 
safety levels, especially under low visibility conditions. An advanced SMGCS (A-
SMGCS) therefore, is expected to provide adequate capacity and safety in relation to 
specific weather conditions, traffic density and aerodrome layout by making use of 
modern technologies and a high level of integration between the various 
functionalities. 
 
The manual was produced to enable manufacturers and operators as well as certifying 
authorities to develop and introduce A-SMGCS depending on local circumstances and 
taking into account global interoperability requirements for international civil aviation 
operations. 
 
The ICAO Operational Requirements and its associated A-SMGCS Concept have been 
the basis for different projects within the EC 4th Framework programme, e.g. for 
DEFAMM and Airport G. The use of the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual enabled the 
project partners, Air Navigation Service Providers, Aerodrome Authorities, 
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Aerodrome Users and Equipment Manufacturers to find commonly agreed A-SMGCS 
solutions for simulation/demonstration facilities within a reasonable time frame, which 
really fulfilled the specific demands in a cost effective way. 
 
The Manual presents the common basic operational concept and system design for a 
universal A-SMGCS adaptable to the specific local aerodrome needs. The concept 
describes the necessary basic A-SMGCS functions Surveillance, Control, Routing and 
Guidance together with their communication and their evolution towards higher 
automation. 
 
A-SMGCS provides full service under a wide range of operational conditions: 
• all visibility conditions until AVOL, 
• growing traffic, and 
• complex traffic flows, 
 
to aircraft and affected vehicles on the movement area between runways and stands in 
order to maintain: 
• safety - the required high level of safety, and 
• capacity - maximum utilisation of flow rates, given by infrastructure. 
 
To help airport operators to decide on the level of automation they need, ICAO has 
defined five levels of implementation for particular aerodromes. All four basic A-
SMGCS functions (i.e. surveillance, control, routing and guidance) are provided at all 
levels, but the part played by automation and avionics increases progressively through 
the levels. 
 
The international agreed modular design, open architecture and foreseen 
standardisation of modules/interfaces enable cost effective A-SMGCS solutions for 
local demands by implementing only those modules for the identified necessary A-
SMGCS functions. A future upgrade of A-SMGCS is possible in an economic way by 
adding the appropriate necessary modules without replacing the whole existing system. 
 
¾ Manual of the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Systems (Doc 9684, 2nd edition, 
1998). 
This document provides guidance material on characteristics of the ground stations and 
airborne transponders of SSR systems which are defined in the Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) of Annex 10, Volume IV. It also describes the 
contribution of SSR as a major system for surveillance purposes in most air traffic 
control (ATC) systems and the data link capability of the Mode S component to be 
utilized as part of the aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN). 
 
¾ Air Traffic Management - Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS-ATM), 
Doc 4444, 14th edition, 2001. 
These procedures are complementary to the Standards and Recommended Practices 
contained in Annex 2 and Annex 11 and specify, in greater detail than in the Standards 
and Recommended Practices, the actual procedures to be applied by air traffic services 
units in providing the various air traffic services to air traffic. 
 
 
 
¾ Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc 9476, 
reprinted March 2003). 
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This manual has been developed to facilitate the implementation of specifications 
relating to SMGC systems found in various Annexes and the PANS-RAC. It contains 
information on: designing an SMGC system for an aerodrome; the functions and 
responsibilities of personnel, procedures; low visibility operations; high traffic volume 
operations; runway protection measures and apron management service. 
 
¾ ANNEX 10 Volume III (Part I - Digital Data Communication Systems; Part II - 
Voice Communication Systems). 
Volume III of Annex 10 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and 
guidance material for various air-ground and ground-ground voice and data 
communication systems, including aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN), 
aeronautical mobile-satellite service (AMSS), secondary surveillance radar (SSR) 
Mode S air-ground data link, very high frequency (VHF) air-ground digital link 
(VDL), aeronautical fixed telecommunication network (AFTN), aircraft addressing 
system, high frequency data link (HFDL), aeronautical mobile service, selective 
calling system (SELCAL), aeronautical speech circuits and emergency locator 
transmitter (ELT). 
 
¾ Annex 10 - Volume IV (Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems). 
Volume IV of Annex 10 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and 
guidance material for secondary surveillance radar (SSR) and airborne collision 
avoidance systems (ACAS), including SARPs for SSR Mode A, Mode C and Mode S; 
and the technical characteristics of ACAS. 
6.2 EUROCONTROL/Airport Operations-Programme 
6.2.1 The EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project 
The Airport Operations Programme forms a part of the EUROCONTROL activity in European Air 
Traffic Management (EATM) and hosts four projects that will enhance airside safety and capacity. 
This will be achieved by improving airside efficiency and harmonising the introduction of new 
technologies.  
 
The A-SMGCS is one of the four above mentioned projects. Its main objectives are set out below: 
 
• To fully develop A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2, ensuring that all issues relevant to operational 
implementation are identified and addressed 
• Identify, develop & validate appropriate procedures 
 
• Verify performance requirements 
 
• Build Safety & Human Factors Cases 
 
• Address training & licensing 
 
• Support harmonised implementation within ECAC 
 
• Support global implementation (through ICAO) 
 
• Ensure coordination with ICAO, EC, FAA, NAV CANADA etc. 
 
• Provide baseline for further developments (A-SMGCS Levels 3 & 4) 
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To develop the concept of Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System, works have 
commenced. To date a considerable amount of work has been performed by ICAO (AOPG PT/2), 
EUROCAE (WG41) and the European Commission (DGTREN). The need for A-SMGCS is also 
recognised through the ATM Strategy for the Years 2000+. This Strategy contains a number of 
‘Directions for Change’ and complementary Operational Improvements, which contribute towards a 
realisation of the overall concept for the ATM Network within ECAC. 
 
The Direction for Change applicable to A-SMGCS is entitled “Improved Traffic Management on the 
Movement Area” and the associated Operational Improvements are: 
 
1. Improvement of Aerodrome Control Service on the Manoeuvring Area; 
2. Improvement of Conflict Detection and Alert for all Traffic on the Movement Area; 
3. Improvement of Planning and Routing on the Movement Area; 
4. Improvement of Guidance and Control on the Movement Area. 
 
These Operational Improvements are to be met through the A-SMGCS Project of the EATM Airport 
Operations Programme, which aims to facilitate the implementation of A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2 
through the development of appropriate operational concepts, requirements and procedures. It also 
aims at addressing related operational issues such as safety, human factors and licensing of controllers. 
 
The first phase of the project has involved the development of agreed requirements for A-SMGCS 
Levels 1 & 2, namely: 
 
• Agreed User Requirements 
• A Concept of Operations 
• Operational Requirements 
• Functional Requirements 
6.2.1.1 Available Manuals/Standards/Documentations 
This phase of the A-SMGCS project is now complete and the following documents are available: 
 
¾ A-SMGCS Project Strategy 
The A-SMGCS subjects and specifications have already been tackled and extensively 
investigated by several organizations such as ICAO, EUROCAE, FAA and 
EUROCONTROL. The aim of this document is to propose a strategy for A-SMGCS 
implementation on the basis of the work that has already been performed by these 
organizations. 
The Strategy presents an operational vision on how ATS and the relationships amongst 
airport stakeholders are expected to evolve through the evolutionary implementation of A-
SMGCS. Such a vision encompasses airspace users, ATM stakeholders, airport operators 
(i.e. pilots, airlines, airport managers, handling operators, apron vehicle drivers). The 
document also phases the A-SMGCS implementation in compliance with the context of 
the gate-to-gate ATM network and the related EATMP Programs as well as the availability 
of ECAC airport projects and technology such as CDM, AMAN, DMAN, ADS, GNSS etc. 
 
¾ Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels 
This document aims at defining the A-SMGCS implementation levels corresponding to the 
A-SMGCS project strategy. These Implementation Levels form a coherent series that: 
 
• Recognizes operational needs; 
• Reflects the evolution of technologies and procedures; 
• Enables airports to equip according to local requirements. 
 
¾ Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II 
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The EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project aims at defining pragmatic implementation 
steps for A-SMGCS. The first step named A-SMGCS Level I focuses on the 
implementation of automated surveillance. A-SMGCS Level II aims at complementing 
surveillance service with a control service that provides a runway safety net and prevents 
incursions into restricted areas. 
 
This documents aim at defining the operational concept and the requirements for A-
SMGCS implementation Levels I & II, i.e. how ATS is expected to evolve through the 
introduction of the integrated Surveillance technology/functions and how ATS is expected 
to evolve through the introduction of the A-SMGCS automated control functions, 
respectively. 
 
¾ Functional Specifications for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II 
On the basis of the analysis of the users needs presented in the Operational Concept & 
Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II, this documents define the 
functional specifications for A-SMGCS Implementation Level I & II. These documents 
focus on the operational and functional requirements. The operational requirements are 
already presented in the OC & R documents and they are recalled and listed in these 
documents for readability purpose. 
 
¾ Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II 
This documents aim at defining the Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS implementation 
Levels I & II. The Validation Master Plan identifies the objectives and the steps of the 
validation process. It provides for each step a full description (resources, timeframe, 
training etc.) and identifies its prerequisites. 
 
This documents also identifies the techniques of evaluation (fast time and real time 
simulations, pre-operational trials at representative airports,…) to assess, demonstrate and 
confirm that A-SMGCS fulfil the Operational Concept with respect to the airport 
manoeuvring area, for all visibility conditions, times of the day and traffic densities. 
 
A particular emphasis is placed upon the validation of A-SMGCS related procedures, with 
the view to providing the data necessary to support their submission to ICAO. To develop 
The Validation Master Plans for A-SMGCS Levels I & II have been defined following the 
steps proposed by the MAEVA methodology [MAEVA], which has been especially 
designed for this kind of exercise by the Master ATM European Validation Plan 
(MAEVA) project. 
 
¾ A-SMGCS Safety Plan 
In connection with the EATM Airport Operations Programme (APR) - maintained by the 
Airport Operations Domain - a safety plan shall be developed to define the safety activities 
to be undertaken within the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
(A-SMGCS) project of the APR. The safety plan shall be addressing separately, A-
SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
The safety activities will be linked with the validation process and will result in two safety 
cases (for Implementation Levels I & II) proving that the project as it is defined is safe for 
introduction. 
Thus, the safety plan shall help to ensure that the safety–related data including safety 
objectives and safety requirements are validated during the validation process and can be 
used to develop the appropriate safety cases for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
 
¾ A-SMGCS Safety Policy 
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This document, the APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document, has been developed by the 
Airport Throughput Business Unit of EUROCONTROL Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Project. The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy 
Document sets out the Safety Policy, the Safety Objectives and describes the safety-related 
tasks and actions to ensure a safe development, implementation and continued operation of 
the A-SMGCS. 
The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document is intended to provide a framework to 
facilitate the safety regulation process of the APR A-SMGCS project. The document also 
represents the initiation of a co-ordination dialogue between the APR A-SMGCS Project 
and the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC). This co-ordination process will continue 
throughout the APR A-SMGCS Project and will cover the development, implementation 
and continued operation of the A-SMGCS. 
The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document includes description of the deliverables of 
the APR A-SMGCS Project. The document is closely related to the APR A-SMGCS 
Safety Plan. 
 
¾ A-SMGCS Human Factors Plan 
The document describes a Human Factors Plan supporting the Validation master Plan for 
the A-SMGCS. A principle aim of the validation process is to assess the Human Factors 
impact of A-SMGCS Level 1 and/or 2 implementation, with data obtained during the 
validation process being used to develop appropriate Human Factor Cases (i.e. Human 
Factor Cases for Implementation Levels 1 & 2). 
A ‘Human Factor Plan’ has to be developed to help identify and ensure that the 
appropriate data are available for the validation  
This plan shall define the Human Factor activities to be undertaken within the A-SMGCS 
project (particularly during the validation process) following EUROCONTROL’s 
guidelines for Human Factors Integration. 
 
 
In parallel, work has progressed on the identification and development of the procedures, necessary to 
support the implementation of A-SMGCS. These procedures focus upon enabling the controller, when 
appropriate, to issue ATC instructions and clearances to aerodrome traffic on the basis of surveillance 
data alone. Harmonised procedures are being developed to ensure that as A-SMGCS becomes 
widespread, pilots, vehicle drivers and controllers will be working to the same rules and standards 
throughout the European region. 
Their description represents the main content of the “A-SMGCS Operating Procedures” document 
produced inside the A-SMGCS project, as well. 
 
All these documents are available on the EUROCONTROL web site 
(http://www.eurocontrol.int/airports). 
 
6.2.2 The Eurocontrol Runway Safety Programme 
The Runway Safety project is one of four research activities under the EUROCONTROL Airport 
Operation Programme. 
 
The objective of the Runway Safety project is to enhance the safety of runway operations by reducing 
or eliminating runway incursions by: 
 
¾ Application of existing ICAO provisions 
 
¾ Enhancing the standard of communications 
 
¾ Increasing situational awareness 
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¾ Raising awareness. 
 
Runway Safety is a vital component of aviation safety as a whole. This initiative is about preventing 
any hazard that might impede the safe take off, taxiing and landing at an aerodrome of all types of 
aircraft. 
 
With the predicted growth of air traffic, the actual numbers of incidents are likely to rise, unless held 
in check by preventative actions such as those investigated in the Runway Safety project. 
 
In July 2001 a joint Runway Safety initiative was launched by GASR, JAA, ICAO and 
EUROCONTROL to investigate specific runway safety issues and to identify preventative actions. 
The Task Force that was subsequently formed to carry out this work comprised of representatives 
from the JAA, EUROCONTROL, ICAO, GASR, ACI, AEA, ECA, ERA, IATA IAOPA, IFALPA, 
IFATCA and many other professional organisations, including Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSPs) and Aircraft Operators. 
 
6.2.2.1 Available Manuals/Standards/Documentations 
The Runway Safety Task Force As a first action carried out a survey of incidents at airports to 
determine causal and contributory factors that led to actual or potential runway incursions. Statistics 
from the survey show that Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers consider that runway incursions are one 
of the serious safety issues in airport operations. It was necessary to carry out a survey initially 
because little data existed about runway safety occurrences. The diverse reporting systems operating 
across the region are typically not capturing the detailed information necessary to determine trends, 
which could then be used to devise, and implement mitigating measures. 
 
The Task Force delivered a set of draft recommendations that were debated and endorsed at the 
International Workshop on Runway Safety hosted by EUROCONTROL at its Brussels Headquarters 
on 9-10 September 2002. 
 
The Recommendations provided by the Task Force concern the most significant issues associated with 
Runway Safety, including communications, human factors, procedures and situational awareness. 
 
The reviewed and approved list of Runway Safety Recommendations are contained in the “European 
Action Plan for the prevention of runway incursions”. 
 
This action plan was the result of the combined efforts of organisations representing all areas of 
aerodrome operations. Those organisations that contributed to this action plan, listed overleaf, are 
totally committed to enhancing the safety of runway operations by advocating the implementation of 
the recommendations that it contains. The ICAO secretariat has lent its strong support to the work of 
this group and urges all states to fully implement the ICAO provisions relevant to runway safety. 
 
This manual and further information concerning Runway Safety initiatives are available on the 
EUROCONTROL web site (http://www.eurocontrol.int/airports). 
 
6.3 EUROCAE 
6.3.1 The EUROCAE’s mission and WG’s 41 activities 
EUROCAE is an international non-profit making organisation.  Membership is open to European 
manufacturers of equipment for aeronautics, trade associations, national civil aviation administrations, 
users, and non-European organisations.  Its work programme is principally directed to the preparation 
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of performance specifications and guidance documents for civil aviation equipment, for adoption and 
use at European and worldwide levels. 
 
The findings of EUROCAE are resolved after discussion among its members and in cooperation with 
RTCA Inc., Washington DC, USA and/or the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Warrendale 
PA, USA through their appropriate committees. 
6.3.1.1 Available Manuals/Standards/Documentations 
 
¾ ED-87 MASPS for Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-
SMGCS) 
This document contains the Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification 
(MASPS) for A-SMGCS at the current level of maturity. This document specifies system 
and equipment characteristics that should be useful to designers, installers, manufacturers, 
service providers and users of systems intended for operational use at aerodromes. 
Functional requirements are used wherever possible to allow flexibility in the design of 
sub-system equipment. 
 
This specification was produced from existing and proposed products, methods and 
requirements that support the A-SMGCS concept. Adherence to this specification is 
intended to enable early operational implementation of a system at an aerodrome in 
accordance with the aerodrome's operational requirements. 
 
Chapter 1 of this document outlines the A-SMGCS role within the future air traffic 
management system. It describes the rationale for the system concept, the expected 
operational goals of the A-SMGCS and outlines the fundamental design concepts. It 
provides definitions of terms used in the document, lists of abbreviations and references.  
 
Chapter 2 outlines the enabling functions of an A-SMGCS and defines an evolutionary 
approach to configuration levels which have been identified by EUROCAE as the steps for 
building the A-SMGCS. Advice on interfaces is provided. 
 
Chapter 3 specifies performance requirements for the principal enabling functions of an A-
SMGCS. 
 
Chapter 4 describes methodologies for the verification of A-SMGCS performance 
requirements specified in Chapter 3 and contains descriptions of the recommended generic 
test procedures needed to verify compliance at both functional element and overall system 
level. 
Supplementary information on test, variation and verification methods is provided within 
appendices A and B. 
 
 
¾ ED 78A GUIDELINES for approval of the provision and use of Air Traffic Services 
supported by Data Communications 
This guidance document was jointly prepared by Special Committee 189 (SC-189) and the 
European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Working Group 53 
(WG-53) and approved by the RTCA Program Management Committee (PMC) on 
December 14, 2000. 
 
This guidance material recommends minimum acceptable criteria for approving the 
provision and use of an ATS supported by data communications when approvals are 
required to show compliance to civil regulations. The criteria are in the form of process 
objectives and guidance for evidence. As used throughout this document, evidence is data 
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produced during the accomplishment of the process objectives. Applicants can use the 
evidence to show an approval authority that the objectives have been satisfied. For 
example, evidence may take the form of standards such as the SPR and INTEROP 
standards, or plans such as the approval plan, or results of verification activities such as 
test results. 
 
This document provides means to establish the operational, safety, performance, and 
interoperability requirements for ATS supported by data communications, to assess their 
validity, and to qualify the related CNS/ATM system. It is a single source document that 
provides guidance for approval of the CNS/ATM system and its operation where 
coordination is necessary across organizations. The guidance material considers the 
allocations of the operational, safety, performance, and interoperability requirements to the 
elements of the CNS/ATM system. These 4 include ground-based elements, operational 
procedures, including the human, and aircraft equipage. 
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7.4 Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Long Name 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast  
AFR Airbus France 
AIBT Actual In-Block Time 
ALDT Actual Landing Time 
AMAN Arrival Manager 
AMS Alenia Marconi Systems 
ANS Air Navigation Services 
ANS_CR Air Navigation Services Czech Republic 
AOBT Actual Off-Block Time 
AOC Aircraft Operations Centre 
AOPG Aerodrome Operations Group 
AOPG/PT2 Airport Operations Group Project Team 2 
ARR Arrival Message 
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Centre 
ASDE Airport Surface Detection Equipment 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movements Guidance and Control Systems 
ASR Approach Surveillance Radar 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCC Air Traffic Control Clearance 
ATCO Air Traffic Controller 
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System 
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management 
ATGS Air Traffic Generator System 
ATOPS A-SMGCS Testing of Operational Procedures by Simulation 
ATOT Actual Take-Off Time 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
BAES BAE Systems 
BETA operational Benefit Evaluation Testing by A-SMGCS 
CDG Charles de Gaulle. 
CDM Collaborative Decision Making  
CDMMA Collaborative Decision Making Multi Agents 
CONOPER Airport Operation Control System 
CTOT Calculated Take-Off Time 
DEFAMM DEmonstration Facilities for Airport Movement Management 
DEP Depart Control 
DFS German ATC Corporation (Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH) 
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System 
DG-TREN Directorate General Transport and Energy 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. / German Aerospace Centre (German Aerospace Research Institute) 
DMAN Departure Manager 
EATM European Air Traffic Management (Eurocontrol) 
EATMP European Air Traffic Management Programme(Eurocontrol) 
EC European Commission 
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ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference 
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
EIBT Estimated In-Block Time 
ELDT Estimated Landing Time 
EMM Extractor Monitoring Message 
EMMA European Airport Movement  
ENAV Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo (Italian ANSP) 
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time 
ETG Euro Telematik 
ETMS Enhanced Air Traffic Management System 
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment manufacturers 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FAA Federal Aviation Authority 
FFS Führungs und Förderungs System (DE) (DFS) / Leadership and promotion system 
FWP Frame Work Programme  
GCAS Ground-based Collision Avoidance System 
GMC Ground Movements Controller 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GP&C Global Positioning and Communication 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
HUD Head Up Display 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IFR Instrumental Flight Rules 
IMC Instrumental Meteorological Conditions 
LAAS Local Area Augmentation System 
LEONARDO Linking Existing ON ground, ARrival and Departure Operations’ 
LVP Low Visibility Procedure 
MAEVA Master ATM European Validation Plan. 
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification 
MLDT Managed Landing Time 
MSF Multi Sensor Fusion 
NLR Nederlands Lucht- en Ruimtevaart Laboratorium (NL) / National Aerospace Laboratori  
NMI Nautical Mile Indicator 
NOTAM Notice to Airman 
NRN Near-range Radar Network 
OC Operational Concept 
ORA Operational Research and Analysis Group 
PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator 
PAX Passengers 
POC Point of Contact 
R&D Research and Development. 
RAAS Regional Area Augmentation System 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification System 
RIMCAS Runway Incursion Monitoring Collision Avoidance System 
RIRP Runway Incursion Reduction Programme 
ROTO Roll Out and Turn Off 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RTO Ready for Take Off 
RTS Real Time Simulations  
RVR Runway Visual Range 
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SACTA Air Traffic Control Automated System 
SAIGA ADP Stand Allocation Manager System 
SAMS SMGCS Airport Movement Simulator 
SAPOS System testing Surveillance data at Braunschweig Airport 
SARIA ADP Airport Resources Manager system 
SARPS Standard and Recommended Practices 
SCA Surface Conflict Alert 
SDF Sensor Data Fusion 
SIBT Scheduled In-Block Time 
SICTA Sistemi Innovativi per il Controllo del Traffico Aereo 
SIRIO Export System for Irregular Operations Solving 
SMA Surface Movement Advisor 
SMAN Surface Manager 
SMR Surface Mouvement Radar  
SMS Safety Management System 
SOBT Scheduled Off-Block Time 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SRC Safety Regulation Commision 
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar 
STA Scheduled Arrival Time 
STIS-B Surface Traffic Information Service – Broadcast 
STMS Surface Traffic Management System 
STNA Service Technique de la Navigation Aérienne 
STR Flight Radar Data Processing System 
TAIU Terminal Automation Interface Unit 
TATM Thales ATM 
THAV Thales Avionics 
TIS-B Traffic Information System-Broadcast 
TMA Terminal Area 
TMU Traffic Management Unit 
TOBT Target Off-Block time. 
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control 
TUD Technische Universität Darmstadt 
TWR Tower 
V&V Validation and Verification 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
WG Working Group 
WP Work Package 
 
